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SEX & SURVEILLANCE:
GENDER, PRIVACY & THE SEXUALIZATION OF
POWER IN PRISON
Teresa A. Miller*
In prison, surveillance is power and power is sexualized. Sex and
surveillance, therefore, are profoundly linked. Whereas numerous
penal scholars from Bentham to Foucault have theorized the force
inherent in the visual monitoring of prisoners, the sexualization of
power and the relationship between sex and surveillance is more aca-
demically obscure. This article criticizes the failure of federal courts
to consider the strong and complex relationship between sex and sur-
veillance in analyzing the constitutionality of prison searches, specifi-
cally, cross-gender searches.
The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part One introduces the
issues posed by sex and surveillance. Part Two describes the sexually
predacious prisoner subculture that frames the issue of cross-gender
searches and demonstrates how the current doctrine participates in
the allocation of power within prison without admitting it. Part Three
presents the doctrinal background for cross-gender search cases. It
traces the precedents that eroded the basic notion of prisoner privacy
and charts the parallel ascendance of sex-based concerns in the regu-
lation of prisons. It also demonstrates that the constitutional doctrine
of cross-gender searches is in disarray and that the confusion within
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the doctrine centers on visual surveillance of male prisoners by female
guards in "contact" positions. Part Four examines Johnson v. Phelan,'
one of the few judicial opinions to draw attention to the realities of
prison life in its discussion of visual surveillance. This section credits
Judge Richard Posner's dissent for recognizing the limitations of pri-
vacy-based judicial approaches to cross-gender search cases, but criti-
cizes it for blaming the doctrinal inadequacies on those who promote
the entry of women into the field of corrections. Finally, this article
concludes that judges need to take a new approach to prisoner privacy
claims and look beyond traditional sex and power stereotypes.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO SEX AND SURVEILLANCE
This article discusses how judges ignore the realities of sex and
power behind bars, and how this failing skews the doctrine of cross-
gender searches by focusing the constitutional privacy inquiry on sex
role stereotypes, rather than sex, power, and the sexualization of
power through sexual violence. To provide a background for these
issues, this introduction draws upon two sources to introduce the diffi-
cult issues posed by sex and surveillance: (1) a prisoner's autobiogra-
phy2 and (2) recent reports of human rights groups on prison
conditions in the United States.'
In Revolutionary Suicide, an autobiographical account of his
imprisonment in a California maximum security prison, Huey
Newton, a Black Panther, makes the following observations about
power, sex and surveillance in the closed society that confronted him
when the bars slammed shut behind him:
I did not know one person at the [California Men's Colony in San Luis
Obispo] when I arrived. Eventually, I met other prisoners and tried to
reach them, but I found it hard to politicize men who lived largely for
the next sexual encounter. To them, sex was all. These men were
exploited and controlled by the guards and the system. Their sexuality
was perverted into a pseudosexuality that was used to control and
1 Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995).
2 See HUEY P. NEWTON, REVOLUTIONARY SUICIDE (1973).
3 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL TOO FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S.
STATE PRISONS (1996). This report reflects research conducted over a two-and-a-half-year
period based on interviews with federal and state corrections' authorities, lawyers, prisoner aid
organizations, and over sixty prisoners incarcerated in California, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan,
New York and the District of Columbia.
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undermine their normal yearnings for dignity and freedom. The sys-
tem was the pusher in this case, and the prisoners were forced to
become addicted to sex. Love and vulnerability and tenderness was
distorted into functions of power, competition, and control.4
Newton describes the way in which prisoners at the Colony would
make dates and engage in sexual liaisons unobserved by guards.
The guards were content to look the other way as long as things stayed
cool. Only political action brought quick, repressive steps. The
guards would simply threaten to put the political offender on a bus
and send him away from his lover. These threats always worked. As a
matter of fact, many guards were themselves homosexuals. Often as I
showered, a guard would stand in the doorway, talking, looking not at
my face but at my penis, and say, "Hey, Newton, how you doin' there,
Newton? Wanna have some fun, Newton?" I laughed at them.5
Newton goes on to explain that even the introduction of conjugal
visitation in California prisons-viewed by liberals as a step forward-
did not diminish the sexual power of guards. "The same coercion and
control are there, even more so, because guards can deny a man his
woman just as they denied a man his man; but the inmate cannot eas-
ily find another woman. This is prison, where every desire is used
against you."6
Newton's account illustrates the sexualization of power. First, he
describes a population of men exploited by their addiction to sex.
Their dependence is created by an institution that denies sexual out-
lets to prisoners as an incident of their punishment. The prison system
exploits the void to increase its control over the population.'
Newton's complaints about the difficulty of politicizing men living for
the next sexual encounter attests to the effectiveness of the sexual
4 H. NEWTON, supra note 2, at 251-52.
5 Id.
6 Id. (emphasis added).
7 Prison regulations across the states and within the federal system uniformly proscribe
sexual intercourse among prisoners. The necessity for such a rule can be debated elsewhere.
The reality, however, is that short of imposing solitary confinement upon every prisoner, it is
impossible for prison managers to police prisoners' sexual contact. Sex in prison is the alcohol of
the Depression Era: outlawed, yet unstoppable. As with Prohibition, corruption is a predictable
result of such an impossible task. Incapable of eliminating the market for sex, guards exploit it
for the purposes of furthering more attainable correctional goals such as keeping order, discour-
aging aggressors and managing the population.
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dependency cultivated by prison regulations and security staff in ren-
dering the population less threatening. Second, Newton demonstrates
the sexualization of power in his description of guards taunting him by
talking to his penis rather than to his face, reducing the man to his
sexual organ. Third, Newton's account also illustrates the power
inherent in surveillance. Simply by looking the other way, guards con-
done conduct that violates prison rules. However, by ignoring inmate
sexual liaisons "as long as things stayed cool," guards retain the
authority to separate couples and generally exploit the sexual depen-
dency of their charges.
The inescapable fact of sexuality-albeit distorted and manipu-
lated as it is in prison-bears upon the application of the Fourth
Amendment in prison. Judges determine the scope of prisoners' pri-
vacy based upon assumptions about the effects of various searches
upon human dignity. Nowhere are these assumptions more evident
than in judicial opinions that consider the constitutionality of body
searches conducted by guards of the opposite sex of the prisoner.
Federal judges are wildly inconsistent about the role of sexuality in
searches. This lack of consensus largely reflects judges' attitudes
about sex and power in relations between guards and inmates of the
opposite sex. Some judges presume the sexual vulnerability of women
regardless of their status as prisoners or guards.8 Many judges treat
biological sex, sexual orientation, and gender as immutable character-
istics, in spite of the fluidity of sexual and gender identity in prisons
and jails.9 This is most obvious in the fallacious assumption by judges
that a societal "nudity taboo" is broken, and thus privacy is violated
only when guards and inmates from two biological categories of sex
are involved: male and female. Indeed, this assumption is implicitly
criticized in Canedy v. Boardman.1° The treatment of biological sex,
sexual orientation and gender as static categories is further evident in
the fact that privacy issues are not generally triggered in prisoner
8 See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1979) (assuming the very nature of female-
ness is sufficient to make women guards vulnerable to sexual attack by male prisoners).
9 See, e.g., Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (9th Cir. 1963).
10 See id. at 185 n.1 ("York [v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963)], many of the cases
... involving cross-gender observations and strip searches, as well as Canedy's brief on appeal
here, make a common assumption. In their declaration that 'the nudity taboo', and hence the
invasion of privacy involved when it is forcibly broken, is much greater between the sexes than
among members of the same sex, [Plaintiffs Brief at 13, York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir.




search cases in the absence of opposite sex contact between guards
and inmates, even when the search conducted is highly invasive.1'
Nevertheless across the board, judges more readily acknowledge the
impact of sexuality upon searches when male guards conduct invasive
searches upon female prisoners.
12
The link between searches and sexual violence against women
prisoners has been made powerfully and repeatedly. Most recently,
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch - both influential
international organizations - have published reports condemning
cross-gender searches because of the danger that such unmonitored
access poses to women prisoners. In the Human Rights Watch Report
entitled, All Too Familiar: Sexual Abuse of Women in U.S. State Pris-
ons,13 investigators found evidence that male correctional officers had
sex with female prisoners including vaginal, anal and oral rape. The
investigation further revealed that male guards had not only used
actual or threatened physical force, but capitalized upon their "near
total authority to provide or deny goods and privileges to female pris-
oners to compel them to have sex or, in other cases, to reward them
for having done so."' 4 The report is highly critical of policies allowing
cross-gender searches, adding that in addition to having sex with pris-
oners, male officers "used mandatory pat-frisks or room searches to
grope women's breasts, buttocks, and vaginal areas and to view them
inappropriately while in a state of undress in the housing or bathroom
areas."' 5 Indeed, Human Rights Watch recommended that state penal
authorities establish policies that limit "inappropriate visual surveil-
lance of prisoners by employees of the opposite sex."16
11 See Cameron v. Hendricks, 942 F. Supp. 499 (D. Kan. 1996) ("The court likewise finds no
legal basis for finding a Fourth Amendment violation on the fact that the guards and nurses were
present during the rectal examination, administration of the enema, and the subsequent bowel
movement. The plaintiff does not allege the presence of members of the opposite sex during any
of these events.").
12 See Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1986) (criticizing the defendants' disparage-
ment of plaintiff male prisoners' claim that being forced to stand naked "before the watchful
eyes of female guards" is embarrassing, but also admitting that "no federal court has yet held
that such conditions violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments").
13 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3.
14 Id. at 1.
15 Id. at 2.
16 Id. at 14.
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In its 1999 report, Not Part of My Sentence: Violations of the
Human Rights of Women In Custody,"v Amnesty International criti-
cizes state and federal prison authorities in the United States for
ignoring international standards requiring close supervision of female
prisoners by female guards.
Contrary to international standards, prisons and jails in the USA
employ men to guard women and place relatively few restrictions on
the duties of male staff. As a consequence, much of the touching and
viewing of their bodies by staff that women experience as shocking
and humiliating is permitted by law.
18
Body searches and surveillance of naked female prisoners in par-
ticular have been tied to sexual misconduct and rape at the hands of
male guards. Nevertheless, the link between searches and sexual vio-
lence against male prisoners remains largely unexplored. This is
somewhat ironic because women prisoners are generally understudied
and their experiences undertheorized. 19 Several factors account for
this irony. First, assumptions of heteronormativity, combined with the
relatively low number of female correctional officers working in men's
prisons raise few concerns for the male prisoner's wellbeing.2° Sec-
ond, men are perceived as more sexually aggressive than women and
women are viewed as more sexually vulnerable. Third, dereliction of
an established public duty is more clear when sexual violence is perpe-
trated by guards, and yet the greatest danger of sexual violence posed
to most incarcerated men is from fellow prisoners. Finally, incarcer-
ated women, as a group, are more sympathetic to the public than
incarcerated men. Thus, the public interest in the conduct and conse-
quences of searches is generally lower when male prisoners are
involved.
While most people agree that punishment is an acceptable aspect
of incarceration, judges disagree as to whether visual surveillance of
17 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE," VIOLATIONS OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, AMR 51/01/99, Mar. 1999, at 39.
18 Id.
19 They have been described as a "forgotten population." See WOMEN PRISONERS: A FOR-
GOTTEN POPULATION (Beverly R. Fletcher, et al. eds., 1993).
20 The national average for female correction officers in 1996 was 18% of all correctional
officers. However, in New York State, one of the ten states that incarcerate the largest number
of women, only 7.5% of the correction officers were female. Gary Craig, A 'Huge Problem' in
Men Guarding Women, DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Aug. 17, 1996, at Al.
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nude prisoners by guards of the opposite sex goes beyond the limits of
appropriate punishment into the realm of dehumanizing treatment
that is neither legally nor morally justifiable. The issue of the appro-
priateness of such searches impacts three distinct interests: (1) pris-
oner privacy; (2) the institutional security of prisons; and (3) women's
rights.
Resolution of these three issues is complicated by three related
trends in prison law and policy: (1) the legal retrenchment of prisoner
rights; (2) increasingly punitive attitudes toward prisoners; (3) and the
impact of equal employment initiatives for women in corrections man-
dated by Title VII.21 The first has raised the bar for constitutionally
cognizable claims. Consequently, treatment of prisoners that formerly
would have established a cause of action might be considered a hard-
ship that is a normal incident of incarceration. The second has erased
bright line distinctions between various classes of persons held in cus-
tody. Therefore, standards for the treatment of prisoners awaiting
trial, those persons who have been convicted of misdemeanors, those
convicted of felonies, and to a lesser extent, those detained awaiting
deportation have merged.
The third trend-increasing employment opportunities for
women in corrections-has encouraged judges and others to position
the privacy rights of prisoners and the employment rights of guards in
diametric opposition. Indeed within the constitutional doctrine of
prisoner's rights, the Eighth Amendment standard for failure (of
guards) to protect prisoners from assault by other prisoners is far
weaker than the legal standard for excessive use of force by guards on
prisoners.22 This has lead to "either or" judicial reasoning - driven
by security concerns - that favors statutorily derived employment
rights over constitutionally derived privacy. The issues raised in Revo-
lutionary Suicide and the reports of the two human rights organiza-
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. (1994). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states, in
pertinent part that: "It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's ... sex .... Id.
§ 2000e-2.
22 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (holding that the Eighth Amendment is
violated when prison personnel knew of, and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate safety);
Hudson v. MacMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (holding that the Eighth Amendment is violated when
force by guards is applied maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm).
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tions underscore the inconsistency and confusion in the doctrine of
cross-gender searches.23
Prisons are sites of sexual and gender complexity that require a
far more nuanced understanding of the relationship between gender,
nudity, sex and violence than that implicit in the doctrinal analysis of
cross-gender search cases. Underlying the distinctions judges draw
between permissible and impermissible searches are gross generaliza-
tions about the significance of being observed naked or only partially
clothed by a stranger of the opposite sex. While they may be accurate
in other privacy-related contexts, their applicability in the context of
prisons must be re-examined.
Any discussion of the constitutional jurisprudence of cross-gen-
der searches in prison must acknowledge the significance of power,
and its sexualization in prison. Sexual aggression is the backdrop
against which prison searches are played out. Men's high-security
prisons and large urban jails are characterized by sexist, masculinized
subcultures where power is allocated on the basis of one's ability to
resist sexual victimization. First, guards relate to prisoners in sexually
derogative ways that emphasize the prisoner's subordinate position.
For example, guards commonly address male prisoners by sexually
derogatory titles such as pussy, sissy, cunt and bitch. These pejorative
titles emphasize and stigmatize the loss of authority incident to incar-
ceration by likening it to unmanliness. Use of derogatory words such
a "pussy" and "cunt" to refer to male prisoners emphasizes and stig-
matizes the prisoner's lack of true male authority. Second, in rare
instances where prisoners gain authority over guards, conversely
power is sexualized through violence. For example, during prison
riots, prisoners frequently sexually assault guards. 24 Finally, between
male prisoners, a social pecking order is established and reinforced
through acts of sexual subjugation (either consensual or coerced sub-
mission to sexual penetration).
These sexual acts occur with greater frequency in the shower, toi-
let and dressing areas of prisoners' living quarters, where female
23 This is both troubling and ironic. The basic values that animated the movement to main-
stream women into employment traditionally reserved for men include respecting human dignity
and upholding the rights individuals who have been denied opportunity based upon stereotypes.
Allowing the employment rights of women to trump the privacy rights of male prisoners is
inconsistent with the Feminist Movement itself.
24 See Rachel Larris, Univ. Washington: Amnesty International Urges Criminalization of
Prison Rape, WASH. DAILY (Feb. 9, 1999).
[Vol. 10:2
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guards have only recently been deployed pursuant to equal employ-
ment initiatives such as Title VII.25 The presence of female guards
exposes to "outsiders" a social hierarchy among males in prison estab-
lished and maintained through sexual domination of other males who
are either unwilling or unable to avoid sexual penetration.
While Fourth Amendment 26 privacy is the primary means by
which prisoners challenge the presence of women in "contact" posi-
tions in men's prisons, privacy doctrine is no panacea. The Fourth
Amendment alone cannot resolve the issue of cross-gender nudity in
an atmosphere of sexual violence. Privacy doctrine gives judges some
leeway to treat prisoners as whole, nuanced beings rather than stereo-
types of their sex. However, privacy doesn't neatly resolve the secur-
ity issue with regard to searches, particularly in men's prisons.
Bathrooms are dangerous places. Protecting prisoners' privacy in
shower and toilet areas by excluding the gaze of female security per-
sonnel will likely make these areas more hazardous than they already
are. However, in eliminating privacy in these areas, courts run the
risk of dehumanizing prisoners, and treating them (as one prominent
Seventh Circuit judge suggests) like animals in a kennel.27
Regardless of whether prisoners' extremely limited rights of pri-
vacy wax or wane, federal courts must deal far more realistically with
the sexualization of power in prison. When judges promote the
employment of women in contact positions in men's prisons by limit-
ing prisoner privacy, courts must be willing to destabilize the
homosocial, sexist and masculine subculture of sexual domination that
exists in men's prison. Judges must not hesitate to peer into the dark
abyss of sexual predation that pervades the culture of men's prisons.
If judges reject cross-gender visual monitoring by female guards work-
ing in "contact" positions within men's prisons by broadening the
scope of prisoner privacy, they must acknowledge their complicity in
the masculinist subculture of sexual domination that encourages sex-
ual violence in men's prisons. Alternatively, perhaps in arguing for
more prisoner privacy, judges may be acting upon humanitarian
impulses to allow subordinated men to "keep their business to them-
25 See supra note 22.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent part: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated ......
27 See Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 151 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J., majority
opinion).
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selves." However, turning a blind eye to sexual violence among pris-
oners can hardly be characterized as humane.
II. THE REALITIES OF PRISON LIFE
A. Among Male Prisoners, Power is Ordered by a Hierarchy of
Dominance and Submission.
Masculinity is greatly valued among male prisoners. For most
male prisoners in long-term confinement, the loss of liberty suffered
during incarceration is accompanied by a psychological loss of man-
hood. Behaviors that the contemporary prison population of
predominantly African American and Hispanic working class young
men associates with manliness are discouraged by prison officials and
punishable as violations of prison disciplinary rules.28 Conduct that
orders power among men on the outside-dominance, aggression,
confrontation, independence, autonomy and sexual access to
women-is off-limits to prisoners consistent with the disciplinary
apparatus. Additionally, the rigid hierarchy of authority between
guards and prisoners is a direct affront to manhood. As one theorist
of prison masculinities explains: "[a]part from the enormous threat
imposed by the loss of heterosexual contact ... the prisoner's mascu-
linity is besieged from every side: through loss of autonomy and inde-
pendence, enforced submission to authority, lack of access to material
goods, all of which are central to his status as a 'man."',29
In the castrating,30 infantilizing world of involuntary correctional
confinement, prisoners develop informal hierarchies that reconstruct
masculinity and distribute power.31 These hierarchies have been doc-
28 Stephen Donaldson, a former prisoner who published a first-hand account of sexual sub-
ordination in prison, points out that "disciplinary codes in American confinement institutions are
unanimous in outlawing all sexual activity." See Stephen Donaldson, A Million Jockers, Punks
and Queens: Sex among American Male Prisoners and its Implications for Concepts of Sexual
Orientation (1993) (visited July 17, 1998) <http://www.igc.apc.org/spr/docs/prison-sex-lec-
ture.html>. Prison regulations also prohibit across-the-board verbal and physical aggression
toward guards, as well as activities such as fighting and gambling among prisoners.
29 Carolyn Newton, Gender Theories and Prison Sociology: Using Theories of Masculinities
to Interpret the Sociology of Prisons for Men, 33 How. J. CRIM. JUST. 193, 197 (1994).
30 See GRESHAM M. SYKES, SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY 70
(Princeton Univ. Press 1971) (1958).
31 In his study of the environmental factors affecting the behavior of violent and victimized
male prisoners, Kevin Wright suggests that manhood is the overarching construct into which
prisoners' insecurities about their surroundings and themselves are collapsed.
Within the twisted confines of an all-male institution, the personal threat of incarceration
often becomes defined and reconciled as an issue of manhood. Doubts about one's iden-
[Vol. 10:2
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umented by several prison sociologists. 3 2 Sexual dominance and sub-
ordination is the principal hierarchy that has emerged among male
prisoners.33 Social scientists offer a variety of explanations for the
centrality of this particular hierarchy. Chodorow focuses broadly on
the traumatic separation from the mother in creating a masculine gen-
der identity that rejects and suppresses femininity.34 Consequently,
masculinity becomes defined by a rigid dichotomy of masculine versus
feminine. Platek suggests that a prisoner subjected to a totalitarian
disciplinary apparatus must react as a radical in recapturing his iden-
tity.36 Segal posits that the conflict between the lives of lower working
class men and the image of masculinity as power contributes to the
formation of a more aggressive masculinity.37 Newton expands upon
this notion, suggesting that the same forces that shape a tough,
hypermasculine ideal among working class men, accompanied by
abhorrence of femininity, are magnified in prison where prisoners'
masculine identities are constantly under siege. He states: "[f]ar from
being stripped of all props and having to find entirely new ways of
dealing with the deprivations of imprisonment, men in prison can be
seen to resort to time-honored techniques that have served to keep
tity are simplified to questions of manliness, and the status of inmates as men is played
out by a ritual of testing to identify weaker individuals, a process which in turn substanti-
ates the strength of those who dominate them.
Kevin Wright, The Violent and the Victimized in the Male Prison, in PRISON VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 104 (Michael C. Braswell, et al., eds. 2d ed. 1994).
32 See, e.g., Richard A. Cloward, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, Social Control in
the Prison, in THEORETICAL STUDIES IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PRISON (Richard A.
Cloward, et al. eds. 1960); see also Richard H. McCleery, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL,
Communication Patterns as Bases of Systems of Authority and Power, in THEORETICAL STUDIES
IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PRISON (Richard A. Cloward, et al. eds., 1960).
33 The mechanisms by which power is ordered among female prisoners are less understood.
Although social relations among women prisoners have been studied less, the research generally
characterizes the social order among women prisoners as family based, recreating familial rela-
tionships lost by removal from the family. The recent influx of female gang members and more
violent female offenders has undoubtedly impacted the subculture in women's prisons. Never-
theless, sexual attack among female prisoners is considered much rarer. Prisoner family group-
ings (mother/daughter, husband/wife, aunt/niece, etc.) appear to be the source of power through
which women who distrust each other guard against being cheated or hurt by other women.
These attachments are often reinforced through sexual intimacy, rather than sexual violence.
Even where female prisoners assume masculine roles, their behavior does not resemble the type
of hierarchical political social organization that flourishes in many men's prisons.
34 See NANCY J. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS &
THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978).
35 See C. NEWTON, supra note 29, at 198.
36 See M. Platek, Prison Subculture In Poland, 18 INr'L J. OF SOC. OF LAW 459, 469 (1990).
37 See LYNNE SEGAL, SLOW MOTION: CHANGING MASCULINITIES, CHANGING MEN (1990).
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men superordinate even when their masculinity has been severely
under threat."38
These masculine characteristics among prisoners have created a
pecking order within prisoner subculture wherein manhood is charac-
terized by one's ongoing ability to resist sexual penetration.39 This
hierarchy is particularly well-defined in juvenile facilities, large urban
jail facilities and maximum security prisons. It consists of three gen-
eral "classes" of prisoners: men, queens and punks.4 °
A prisoner's position in the hierarchy of dominance and submis-
sion simultaneously defines his social and sexual status.41 Prisoners
who are considered "men" have the greatest authority and power.
They are at the top of the prisoner hierarchy. "Men" rule the joint
and establish values and norms for the entire prison population.42
They are political leaders, gang members, and organizers of the drug
trade, sex trade, protection rackets and the smuggling of contraband
in prison.
A small class of "queens ' 43 exists below "men." Generally no
more than 1 or 2% of the population, they seek and are assigned the
passive sexual role historically associated with women. They are
referred to with feminine pronouns and terms. Their willingness to be
sexually submissive makes them highly desirable as sexual partners.
The queen is the foil that instantly defines his partner as a "man."
However, consistent with the sexism that pervades the prison subcul-
ture, "queens" are excluded from positions of power within the
inmate economy.
38 C. NEWTON, supra note 29, at 198.
39 Ordering power through the establishment of a pecking order serves the important func-
tion of reducing the amount of blood shed in the inevitable conflicts that arise when large num-
bers of racially and geographically diverse young men, convicted of crimes of varying degrees of
severity, are involuntarily brought together and confined in close quarters. See id. at 197.
40 Id.
41 "In prison, sexual status is a prisoner's social status." Donaldson, supra note 28. See
Donald Tucker, A Punk's Song: View from the Inside, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND GOVERNMENT,
POLITICS AND PRISONS (Wayne Dynes & Stephen Donaldson eds., 1982) (describing the sexual
power structure in big city jails and medium-security prisons from the perspective of having been
a Quaker protester arrested, confined and raped in the D.C. Jail in November 1980).
42 There are sub-categories within the category of "men," and the terminology for these
sub-categories varies regionally and over time. For instance, a sexual active "man" is called a
"jocker" or "pitcher." When a jocker is paired off with another prisoner, he becomes a
"Daddy." "Men" who procure sex through coercion are known as "gorillas" or "booty bandits."
See id. See also Robert W. Dumond, The Sexual Assault of Male Inmates in Incarcerated Set-
tings, 20 INT'L J. OF SoC. OF LAw 135, 139 (1992).
43 Queens are also referred to as "bitches," "broads" and "sissies."
[Vol. 10:2
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At the bottom of the hierarchy are "punks" or "bitches." 44
"Punks" are male prisoners who have been forced into sexual submis-
sion through rape or the credible threat thereof, either by an individ-
ual or a group of prisoners (i.e. gang rape). Punks are treated as
slaves. Sexual access to their bodies is sold through prostitution,
exchanged in satisfaction of debt and loaned to others for favors.4a
Queens and punks are treated similarly in many respects. Both
are denied the privileges of manhood, enslaved by "men," excluded
from positions of leadership and are the subjects of sexual commerce.
However, punks are lower in the hierarchy of power among prisoners
because they bear the stigma of "fallen men," incapable of resisting
sexual penetration. This is not, however, a failing of queens who will-
ingly submit to sexual penetration.
Because status within the hierarchy is acquired through the forci-
ble subjugation of others,46 and one's status as a man can be lost irre-
trievably through a single incident of sexual submission, "men" must
constantly demonstrate their manhood through sexual conquest.
Those who do not vigorously demonstrate their manhood through
sexual conquest are more apt to be challenged and be potentially
overpowered. Hence, the surest way to minimize the risk of demotion
is to aggressively prey on other prisoners.47
44 In his study of differences and similarities between the perpetrators and victims of pris-
oner violence, Kevin Wright describes the victims of prison rape as "often weaker inmates who
cannot withstand the threats and aggressive advances of stronger inmates" and who "succumb to
the constant pressure applied as masculinity is tested and may lack the physical and ego strength
or social abilities to avoid conflict. According to Wright, victims of prisoner rape tend to be
small, white, young, middle class and lack street smarts. See Wright, supra note 31.
45 Punks are "for all practical purposes slaves and can be sold, traded, and rented or loaned
out at the whim of their 'Daddy."' Donaldson, supra note 28.
46 Gang affiliation, racial and ethnic affiliation, socioeconomic class, connections to organ-
ized crime, sexual preference, age, nature of offense, physical stature and length of sentence
influence a prisoner's status as well, and may mitigate-in certain circumstances-the degree to
which a prisoner is subjected to sexual violence.
There is a fascinating racial component to the sex-based pecking order among prisoners that
corresponds to the majority minority racial composition of contemporary prisons. White male
prisoners are more likely to be raped than black male prisoners. They are also more likely to be
raped by black prisoners. Furthermore, due to ethnic affiliation and tension, black prisoners as a
group are more likely than white prisoners to close ranks to prevent black heterosexuals from
being "turned out." For a brief, but revealing consideration of rape and race, see LEE H.
BOwKER, PRISON VICTIMIZATION (1980).
47 See Wright, supra note 31. See also Dumond, supra note 42 ("one third of sextal assault
victims exploit other [inmates], often as a means of earning respectability and avoiding the bot-
tom of the 'pecking order' by becoming aggressive toward weaker peers") (citing C. Bartollas &
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The precariousness of manhood among prisoners creates an inter-
nal economy of prison sexual assault. "Queens" are vastly outnum-
bered by "men." And according to Donaldson, the vast majority of
"punks" are "heterosexual by preference and history." Therefore the
conversion of heterosexual males to "punks" serves to maintain equi-
librium within the prison subculture. In Donaldson's own words:
The total population of queens and punks is rarely high enough to
meet the demand for sexually submissive prisoners ... and this imbal-
ance of supply and demand is a key to understanding the social
dynamics of relentless competition among the men, who in rough
joints are in danger of "losing their manhood" at any time.a"
The pecking order is based upon a kind of gender-based misog-
yny that transcends categories such as sex and sexual orientation.
Males unable or unwilling to resist "female" or passive sex roles are
vilified. They are referred to with feminine pronouns and are fre-
quently turned into sexual slaves of more dominant males. This social
dynamic is distinct from the stigmatization of homosexuality.4 9
B. Guards Participate in the Hierarchy of Domination and
Submission among Male Prisoners.
1. The Relationship between Male Guards and Male Prisoners is
based upon a Similar Hierarchy of Masculinity.
A strict hierarchical system of authority orders power between
guards and prisoners. This hierarchy enables guards to supervise pris-
oners with less conflict and greater efficiency. Generally speaking, the
higher the security level of the facility, the more rigid the hierarchy.5 °
Prisoners vastly outnumber correctional officers. Consequently, hier-
C.M. Sieveides, The Sexual Victim in a Co-Educational Juvenile Correctional Institution, 58(1)
PRISON J. 80-90 (1983)).
48 Donaldson, supra note 28.
49 Connell explains the link between misogyny and homophobia. Although the derogation
of homosexuality is the act of men against a minority of other men, it is the forced repression of
the "feminine" in all men. In his words, "[t]he justifying ideology for the patriarchal core com-
plex and the overall subordination of women requires the creation of a gender-based hierarchy
among men." R.W. CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER: SOCIETY, THE PERSON AND SEXUAL POLI-
TICS 215 (1987).
50 Thus, the hierarchy between guards and inmates bears some resemblance to the pecking
order among prisoners, which similarly becomes more rigid in higher security facilities. WAYNE
WOODEN & JAY PARKER, MEN BEHIND BARS: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN PRISON 23 (1982).
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archy creates and reinforces the guards' ability to control large num-
bers of diverse violence-prone individuals involuntarily confined
together in close quarters. In this current era of prison expansionism
and "get tough" prison policies, hierarchy is an essential component of
the carceral machinery.5"
At this early stage of the sexual integration of corrections, guard
subculture continues to mirror the homosocial subculture of male pris-
oners. Prison guards and state prisoners come from predominantly
working class origins. It is therefore not surprising that working class
masculinities operate within both groups. Indeed the hypermasculine
ideal is as prominent among guards as it is among prisoners. Mascu-
linity is a strongly held group value. Guards who show fear threaten
the safety of all other guards. They are derogated as being less than
men, and other guards refer to them as "pussies" and "faggots."52
The guard socialization process reinforces "toughness." Using
obscene language and shouting orders at prisoners are crude devices
for maintaining social distance.53 The authoritarianism of guards may
be linked to the fact that guards are at the bottom of a hierarchical
administrative bureaucracy.54 As such, they are the furthest removed
from the decision-making process and the least likely to affect it. Nev-
ertheless, they are subject to the rules and directives established at
each higher level. Although there are many instances in which close
51 The rigid hierarchical structure through which guards control the male prison population
creates problems for women guards whose role in men's prisons has only expanded to "contact"
positions and security in the past thirty years. The field of corrections resembles the military.
Like the military, authority among guards is established through rank. Guards hold titles of
captain, major, lieutenant, etc. Each successive rank has authority greater than those holding
any lesser rank. Also like the military, men have long dominated leadership within the field of
corrections, and this history has made the supervision of lower status women problematic. In a
field that was almost exclusively male until the 1970s, and in which men still outnumber women
significantly, and advancement is difficult for women, women guards are generally subordinate
to more privileged male officers. Female guards are frequently subjected to sexual harassment
and scapegoating at the hands of male guards who disapprove of their presence.
Masculinized, authoritarian social interaction between prisoners and guards often creates
difficulties for women guards. Women are relatively new to the field of corrections. They have
distinctly different supervisory styles, hence they tend to interact differently with prisoners than
male guards. Unlike their male colleagues, female guards are less likely to brutalize or victimize
inmates. See LYNN ETrA ZIMMER, WOMEN GUARDING MEN 25 (1986).
52 Id.
53 But this type of socialization is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it reduces over-
friendliness with prisoners that leads to reciprocal obligation and corruption. On the other hand,
it encourages the abuse of authority by dehumanizing prisoners. See SYKES, supra note 30.
54 See ZIMMER, supra note 51, at 16.
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kinship relations may develop between officers and prisoners, the
dominance of the guard always remains unquestioned.
2. The Dominance of Guards over Prisoners is Sexualized in Words
and Conduct.
The subculture of male guards stresses machismo and overt dis-
plays of masculinity. In the dangerous environment inside prisons,
exaggerated masculinity serves to discourage guards from appearing
fearful, and therefore vulnerable to prisoners. The fearfulness of one
guard affects the security of many other guards in the facility. Conse-
quently, there is tremendous pressure on all guards to conform to an
overtly masculine standard of conduct."
The authority of guards over prisoners is sexualized with great
frequency in relationships between male guards and male prisoners.56
First, sexually explicit language and sexual innuendo is frequently
directed toward male prisoners by male guards to emphasize their
powerlessness, their lack of masculinity, and to reinforce the authority
of guards. Male guards constantly refer to male prisoners as "pussies"
and "faggots" and "cunts." Second, although the code of silence
among prisoners and guards usually renders it practically invisible,
occasionally improper sexual relations between guards and prisoners
comes to light.57 Third, although there is little scholarship on the role
of guards in preventing or facilitating inmate-on-inmate sexual assault,
Donaldson's experience suggests that guards participate in, and often
encourage, the rape-based pecking order even though sexual activity
among prisoners uniformly violates the disciplinary rules of every
state department of corrections.
55 The machismo culture of male guards is not entirely attributable to the nature of the
occupation. It reflects, at least in part, working class male culture, which emphasizes the impor-
tance of aggressiveness and sexual prowess.
56 From Joanne Little to Amy Fisher, the public is most familiar with sexual coercion of
female prisoners in high profile cases of custodial sexual misconduct. The lack of public aware-
ness about improper sexual relations between male guards and male prisoners may be attributa-
ble to two factors: (1) under the inmate code to which male prisoners adhere, "ratting" is
unmanly; and (2) being "turned out" by a guard jeopardizes one's social status even more than
being raped by a fellow inmate. Many cross-gender search cases reflect concern for the sexual
vulnerability of female prisoners who may be victimized by guards misusing their authority. The
numerous accounts of sexual violence against (and misconduct toward) women prisoners
notwithstanding, it is far more common to see power over male prisoners sexualized.
57 See Donatello Lorch, Prisoner's Cry of 'Rape' is Heard; Judge Rules a Man was Assaulted
by a Suffolk Official, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1996, at BI.
[Vol. 10:2
SEX & SURVEILLANCE
For example, guards and administrators may knowingly approve
housing requests submitted for the purpose of keeping couples
together, particularly if it helps to maintain internal order by minimiz-
ing fights.58 Conversely, guards may reject housing requests to punish
a dominant prisoner or to put him in his place. Guards may even
actively encourage an unmatched dominant prisoner who is perceived
as disruptive to rape a less dominant prisoner on the theory that he
will settle down once he has a steady sexual partner. Prison guards
have even gone so far as to facilitate rape in exchange for payment, to
destroy the leadership potential of a charismatic prisoner or to punish
a particularly offensive inmate.59 At least one study suggests that
officers who are more tolerant of homosexuality facilitate victimiza-
tion by failing to enforce policies prohibiting consensual sex on the
theory that it is none of their business. These officers often overlook
sexual victimization that occurs through coercion, but without obvious
outward signs of force (like the brandishing of a knife or "shank").6"
C. Searches are Threatening in a System where Fellow Inmates and
Guards Participate in Ordering Power through Sexual
Subjugation.
Searches of prisoners take place within this masculinized, sexual-
ized environment where sexual language and conduct reinforce
authority. Tactile searches can be initiated randomly and without
notice. It is therefore not surprising that prisoners perceive searches
as degrading, particularly when it is so easy for guards to use their
58 In an interview with a correctional officer about staff attitudes toward homosexuality,
Wooden and Parker suggested that sexual relationships between prisoners were tolerated, and
even encouraged by prison staff. The officer responded: "To a degree this is true. It's a way of
keeping down trouble and maintaining order. Also it cuts down on the paperwork." See
WOODEN & PARKER, supra note 50, at 109.
59 Guards have been known to pay prisoners, called "enforcers," to rape and beat other
prisoners. Indeed, last year, five guards at California's Corcoran State Prison were indicted for
ordering the brutal rape and the beating of inmate Eddie Dillard as retribution for kicking a
female guard. Guards at Corcoran placed a 230-pound violent sexual predator in a cell with 23-
year-old, 120-pound Dillard. For two days, Dillard was repeatedly raped and beaten by the
enforcer despite his efforts to call for help by pounding on the floor and cell door. The enforcer
was compensated with tennis shoes and extra food rations. See Jerry Bier & Matthew G.
Kreamer, 5 Corcoran Guards Indicted; This case Follows Indictments Against Eight Other Prison
Guards in February, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 9, 1998, at Al.
60 H. Eigenberg, Rape in Male Prisons: Examining the Relationship Between Correctional
Officers' Attitudes Toward Male Rape and their Willingness to Respond to Acts of Rape, in
PRISON VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 31.
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discretion to order searches maliciously and in retaliation for a pris-
oner's conduct.
Within an environment where authority is sexualized and guards
are permitted to search prisoners randomly, searches conducted by
female guards are easily perceived as degrading with the sole purpose
of flaunting the powerlessness of male prisoners.
D. Courts Fail to Take into account the Sexualization of Power in
Men's Prisons when Considering the Propriety of Female
Guards Visually Monitoring Naked Male Prisoners.
Prison officials understand the clear link between tactile searches
and violence. In the predacious prison environment, unwanted physi-
cal contact is extremely threatening, whether it is initiated by guards
or by inmates. Consequently, even where prison administrators are
given doctrinal leeway to conduct tactile searches across gender in
non-emergency situations, they rarely do so. In an environment
where manhood is defined as the ability to resist "feminization"-being
forced to submit to sexual penetration (like a woman)-within a
larger sexist society that reinforces male dominance over women, it is
easy to understand how threatening it is for male prisoners to be
involuntarily subjected to the gaze-the visual surveillance-of
female guards. Female surveillance is unmanly in a culture where
manliness is highly prized and is therefore degrading. For many men
in prison, the presence of female guards is a psychological bridge to a
more conventional, masculine lifestyle of the past.61 Yet the idea that
visual surveillance by female guards would affect more than a pris-
oner's modesty or preference is absent from most judicial opinions on
cross-gender surveillance.
Even when courts and commentators explicitly focus on the rela-
tionship between sex and power in prison, they overwhelmingly focus
on the sexual conduct of male guards toward female prisoners. 62 This
61 Various prison scholars have described the positive impact of female guards on inmates
in men's prisons. See generally ZIMMER, supra note 51, at 151-53.
62 The news media overwhelmingly focuses on the sexual abuse of female prisoners by
guards. See Ann Scott Tyson, Sexual Abuse Rises as More Women Do Time, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, Dec. 9, 1996, at 1; Craig, supra note 20; Rhonda Cook, Prison Scandal Continues as
Rookie Guard is Fired - He Admitted to Inmate Sex, Official's Say, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 17,
1992, at E6; Lori Montgomery & Dawson Bell, U.S. Alleges Sex Abuse of Women at 2 Prisons -
State Official Blasts Findings as 'Absurd', DET. FREE PRESS, Mar. 30, 1995, at 1A.
Power is sexualized in women's prisons, but less is understood about how. Historically,
male guards have used their authority to procure sexual favors from female prisoners. Custodial
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reflects not only a gender bias-that power in sexual relationships is
exercised by men (dominant) upon women (vulnerable)-but a heter-
osexual presumption that sex between guards and prisoners always
involves individuals of two different sexes. Only very recently have
stories of men sexually victimized in prison-either at the hands of
fellow prisoners or prison guards-begun to emerge in the media.
63
As the case of Dothard v. Rawlinson 4 demonstrates, even when the
facts present women as authority figures-guards in contact positions
in men's prisons-concern for their vulnerability is in the forefront,
and the vulnerability of their male counterparts is not acknowledged.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INCONSISTENT CROSS-GENDER
SEARCH DOCTRINE AND ITS FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE
THE REALITIES OF PRISON LIFE
Women have long been excluded from employment as security
personnel in men's prisons. Historically, it was thought to be inappro-
priate for women to perform such dangerous, masculine work because
their physical safety would be jeopardized by virtue of their biological
sex. However, over the past thirty years, as federal sex discrimination
and equal employment legislation have provided women with entry
into this non-traditional field, prisoners and male correctional officers
have judicially challenged prison policies permitting female guards to
conduct searches of male prisoners and visually monitor prisoners in
their living quarters.65
sexual misconduct continues to present a crisis in women's prisons, although recent studies of
economies of sexual favoritism in women's prisons suggest that not all sexual encounters
between guards and female prisoners are unilaterally coercive, and that power is exercised on
both ends. Indeed, sex is often offered in exchange for favors guards are uniquely suited to
perform, including overlooking rule violations and favoritism. This clear example of abuse of
authority by guards supports the need for a more conservative approach to cross-gender supervi-
sion and searches in women's prisons, or at the least, a different approach to cross-gender
searches than that employed in men's prisons.
63 See Greg Burton, Prison Rapes Covered Up, Inmates Charge, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 9,
1997, at B1.
64 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
65 Although women have been involved in corrections since the beginning of incarceration,
their early role as matrons in women's reformatories and later as counselors in juvenile facilities
reflect sexual stereotyping. Matrons were seen as role models for misguided women. Women
were viewed as particularly suited to be juvenile corrections' personnel due to their maternal
influence on delinquent youth. See JOCELYN POLLOCK, SEX AND SUPERVISION: GUARDING
MALE AND FEMALE INMATES 8 (1986); ZIMMER, supra note 51, at 1. The historical practice of
hiring only men to guard male prisoners changed only after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
amended to include gender discrimination in 1972.
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The judicial opinions resolving these challenges have established
boundaries of permissible and impermissible searches by relying heav-
ily on the Fourth Amendment proscription of unreasonable searches
and seizures.66 There are significant advantages to this approach. Pri-
vacy is genderless. It creates a zone of protection by limiting the
search authority of public actors. However, as the protection of pris-
oner privacy has declined in recent years-consistent with the broader
retrenchment of prisoner's rights-the bar for what constitutes an
unreasonable search has risen steadily. Some judges have gone so far
as to reduce protection of prisoner privacy to the far narrower ambit
of the Eighth Amendment, virtually eliminating the Fourth Amend-
ment as a check on the search authority of guards.67
In the absence of all but a residuum of prisoner privacy, judges
increasingly focus on the moral and distributive dimensions of women
guarding men. Thus, the taboo against an individual being seen naked
before a stranger of the opposite sex drives the doctrine. This formal-
istic judicial emphasis on biological sex is dubious in the context of
today's high security men's prisons. First, it overlooks the significance
of the sexual orientation of the guard and the prisoner, as prisons are
arenas of complex and transitional sexualities. Second, it fails to inter-
rogate the hierarchy of masculinity that sexualizes power among
inmates, and bears upon the desirability of women guarding men in
their living quarters. In sum, courts conflate gender, sex and sexual
orientation in a manner that makes the doctrine of cross-gender
searches incoherent.
Part Three of this article focuses on the limitations of the cross-
gender search doctrine. It takes as its starting point the decline of
prisoner privacy and the resulting lack of harmony among the federal
courts. It goes on to chronicle the conflation of gender, sex and sexual
orientation; the distracting insistence upon formal symmetry; and the
failure of the doctrine to take into account hierarchies of masculinity
at work in higher security men's prisons. These factors complicate the
constitutional question of when (and under what circumstances)
female guards-as a matter of law and policy-should be allowed to
search male prisoners.
66 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
67 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
[Vol. 10:2
SEX & SURVEILLANCE
A. The Supreme Court Has Eroded the Privacy Protection for
Prisoners.
In the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has retrenched pro-
tection of prisoner privacy. Incarceration has traditionally limited the
full exercise of prisoners' constitutional rights, particularly when that
exercise compromises a punitive objective.68 But courts have long
held that prisoners do not forfeit all their constitutional protections
when they enter the custody of correctional officials.69 The impact of
incarceration is that prisoners' constitutional rights are limited, not
barred. However, within the last ten years, prisoners challenging
searches on Fourth Amendment grounds are finding that precious lit-
tle of their constitutional rights remain. They are fighting an uphill
battle, for within the current penal system maintaining security domi-
nates all other penological objectives. Prison officials rely heavily
upon searches to maintain security by flushing out contraband weap-
ons and drugs. Consequently, the legitimate impingement upon pris-
oners' Fourth Amendment rights that is a limitation in theory, has
begun to resemble a bar in practice.
The retrenchment of Fourth Amendment privacy in prison that
began in the late 1970s was foreshadowed at least a decade earlier by
material changes in the law of criminal procedure. At the time it was
decided, Katz v. United States7" expanded the privacy of criminal sus-
pects by liberating privacy protections from rights grounded in prop-
erty, trespass and theft. Ironically, however, the objective standard
established in Katz has been used to support even more restrictive
constructions of privacy. Katz first established that a government
search violates the Fourth Amendment only when an individual has a
"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy."'" Katz
68 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987) (stating that judicial restraint and defer-
ence to prison authorities must temper federal courts' consideration of prisoners' constitutional
claims).
69 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 538 (1974) ("Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes
unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen, a 'retraction justified by the con-
siderations underlying our penal system.' But though the needs and exigencies of the institu-
tional environment may diminish his rights, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional
protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Consti-
tution and the prisons of this country." (citation omitted)).
70 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
71 Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, after Katz, a property interest is no longer
sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in items or activity conducted in a par-
ticular place. It is one of several factors to be considered. In the prison context, Fourth Amend-
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involved a Fourth Amendment challenge to the admission into evi-
dence of a telephone conversation in which illegal bets were being
placed. FBI agents taped the conversation by attaching an electronic
recording device to the outside of the public phone booth where the
defendant placed his calls. The majority reversed the conviction on
the ground that the government failed to obtain advance authoriza-
tion for the wiretap by a magistrate upon a show of cause.
In Katz, the court disengaged the privacy analysis from a prop-
erty-based analysis that previously required physical trespass upon a
constitutionally protected area before the Fourth Amendment was
violated. Katz emphasized that privacy inures to the person rather
than to places. Justice Harlan's concurrence imposed a two-fold
requirement for governmental intrusions upon a person's privacy.
First, a person must have exhibited a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy; and second, the expectation must be one that society is prepared
to recognize as "reasonable." Even though the majority opinion (in
conjunction with Justice Harlan's concurrence) was read to expand
privacy protections of intangible matter such as telephone conversa-
tions, the objective aspect of the "reasonableness" test was inter-
preted by later cases to narrow the scope of Fourth Amendment
privacy. As a result, Katz has tethered an individual's protection from
governmental intrusion into areas and activities she wishes to remain
private to external assessments of what society accepts as
reasonable .72
Katz created a ripple whose effects would eventually be felt much
farther down the chain of custody. It established the landscape upon
which the Supreme Court would revisit the privacy analysis and so
narrowly apply it to prisons as to sanction all but the most invasive
ment protections detached from property interests might potentially benefit inmates, since they
are confined on state property, with few personal possessions.
72 Over the past twenty years, application of the Katz standard has narrowly restricted the
scope of Fourth Amendment privacy for criminal suspects in a variety of search contexts. When
individuals erected fences, and posted clearly visible "No Trespassing" signs on secluded,
wooded private property approximately one mile from their house, the Kentucky State Police
were held not to have violated their Fourth Amendment rights by disregarding the signs and
entering the property, finding two marijuana patches. The Court found no societal interest in
protecting the privacy of the cultivation of crops in open fields not effectively concealed from
public observation in spite of the individuals' subjective intent to keep their activity private
through the use of signage and fencing in the remote location. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that exposure of sus-




searches. The Supreme Court narrowed the grounds upon which pris-
oners could object to searches in three pivotal cases: Bell v. Wolfish,7 3
Hudson v. Palmer74 and Turner v. Safley.7 Hudson applies the Fourth
Amendment privacy doctrine narrowed by Katz and its progeny to
cell searches in prison. Bell and Turner curtail the standard for judi-
cial review of prisoners' constitutional challenges to prison regula-
tions. Although none of these cases specifically address the
permissibility of cross-gender searches, all three dominate the analysis
of claims challenging and defending cross-gender search policies.
Bell v. Wolfish marked the end of the Warren Court Era wherein
prisoner rights were expanded, primarily to protect prisoners from
overzealous correctional authorities with a history of abusing power
under color of law. In formulating legal standards that required
prison officials to justify their actions-and in many cases demon-
strate that these actions constituted the least restrictive means of
accomplishing a legitimate correctional goal-courts hoped to prevent
the reoccurrence of deplorable prison conditions and abuses of power
which came to light in the 1950s and 1960s. Bell heralded the aban-
donment of such broad standards of review.
Bell considered the claims of pretrial detainees at a federally
operated short-term custodial facility in New York City. These
detainees challenged, inter alia, a policy of conducting visual body cav-
ity searches after every contact visit on the ground that it was more
intrusive than necessary to satisfy prison officials' legitimate interest
in maintaining security; therefore, the policy constituted an excessive
and unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.76
Authorities at the detention facility could not demonstrate that visual
body cavity searches had been effective in deterring the possession of
contraband. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the legitimate
security interests of prison officials outweighed the more limited pri-
vacy interests of inmates in being free from visual body cavity
searches.77 The Court avoided articulating the precise scope of the
73 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
74 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
75 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
76 As pre-trial detainees lack the protection of the Eighth Amendment, the prisoners'
claims were limited to the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979).
77 Indeed, the Court was persuaded that the very fact that no correlation between the
searches and the interception of contraband could be demonstrated was more "a testament to
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Fourth Amendment in a detention facility. Instead, it found that as
long as the search policy was rationally related to a legitimate non-
punitive governmental purpose, there was no clear violation of the
Fourth Amendment.78 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist
criticized federal courts for second-guessing the "judgment calls" of
prison management, and restored to officials outside of the Judicial
Branch of Government policy determinations that do not blatantly
violate the Constitution.79 Bell has been broadly applied in the lower
federal courts, standing for the proposition that prisoners lose a sub-
stantial amount of Fourth Amendment privacy protection when they
enter the prison gate.8"
Five years later, in Hudson v. Palmer,8 the Supreme Court again
considered the application of the Fourth Amendment in prison, this
the effectiveness of this search technique as a deterrent than to any lack of interest on the part of
the inmates to secrete and import such items when the opportunity arises." Id. at 559.
78 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538.
79 Id. at 458.
80 In Bell, the Supreme Court employs several important discursive techniques that are
applied in subsequent judicial analyses of cross-gender searches. Alan Hyde catalogues these
techniques in his survey of legal constructions of the body. See ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAw
163 (1997). First, Bell humanizes the prison environment while dehumanizing the prisoner's
body. Justice Rehnquist describes the detention facility involved in some detail, obviously
impressed by its "modern design" and "innovative features." He distinguishes the facility from
the traditional, historicized notion of the dank, colorless jail with "clanging steel gates," noting
that it has been described as "the architectural embodiment of the best and most progressive
penological planning," while refraining from referring to the facility by its popular title, "the
Tombs." Bell, 441 U.S. at 525. In contrast to the detailed description of the detention facility,
the majority characterizes the inmates as potential security threats. It is the dissent that draws
attention to medical testimony that inmates view the body cavity searches conducted in the
Tombs as humiliating, engendering fears of sexual assault and physical abuse by guards.
Bell reinforces the notion of prisoners as dangerous, undifferentiated masses by treating the
protections afforded pre-trial detainees under the Fourth Amendment as no broader than those
afforded convicted felons. In response to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that persons
only charged with a criminal offense should have greater substantive rights with respect to their
conditions of confinement, the majority was quick to dismiss a doctrine it describes as "axio-
matic" and "elementary" to the administration of criminal law as having no application to the
determination of the rights of pre-trial detainees during confinement. Id. at 533. Thus, the
majority establishes that the entrance to the prison or jail as the point at which a significant
Fourth Amendment protections are shed. See id. at 556-57.
Secondly, Bell employs an "interest balancing" test which weighs the diffuse, unindividuated
interest of the prisoner in bodily privacy against the particularized needs of the prison. Hyde
observes that the very metaphor of balancing demonstrates how law assumes power over the
body: "[t]he metaphor thus strips the body ... of the 'weight' that it bears in pounds, metamor-
phoses the body into an interest, then reifies the interest as if it had weight to be put into a
balance." HYDE supra, at 159.
81 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
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time in the context of a random, unannounced search of a prisoner's
cell, known as a "shakedown" search. Palmer, a prisoner in a Virginia
prison facility, complained that a guard searched his cell randomly and
without notice, falsely charged him with an infraction of prison disci-
plinary rules, and destroyed non-contraband personal property in the
form of legal papers. This time, the Court announced unequivocally
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the confines of a prison
cell.82 The Court found a prisoner's interest in privacy within his cell
to be irreconcilable with "the concept of incarceration" and the
"objectives of penal institutions," and as such, non-existent.83 Chief
Justice Burger for the majority stated:
we hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any
subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his
prison cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription
against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of
the prison cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their
individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incar-
ceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions.
84
In contrast to the holding of the appellate court in Bell, the
Supreme Court held in Hudson that prisoners do not possess even the
limited Fourth Amendment protection against searches conducted
solely to harass or humiliate.85 The Court construed the recognition
of any quantum of protection, even if only against searches conducted
purely to harass, as effectively challenging the reasonableness of the
search.86 Absent application of the Fourth Amendment to the prison
cell, such a challenge to the reasonableness of a search has no basis in
82 See id. at 536 ("we hold that the Fourth Amendment has no applicability to a prison
cell").
83 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526.
84 Id. at 525-26.
85 "The Court of Appeals was troubled by the possibility of searches conducted solely to
harass inmates; it reasoned that a requirement that searches be conducted only pursuant to an
established policy or upon reasonable suspicion would prevent such searches to the maximum
extent possible. Of course, there is a risk of maliciously motivated searches, and of course,
intentional harassment of even the most hardened criminals cannot be tolerated by a civilized
society. However, we disagree with the court's proposed solution. The uncertainty that attends
random searches of cells renders these searches perhaps the most effective weapon of the prison
administrator in the constant fight against the proliferation of knives and guns, illicit drugs, and
other contraband." Id. at 528.
86 See id. at 530.
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law. The Court relegated such claims to the Eighth Amendment and
state tort or common law remedies.87
The sweeping language of the majority in Hudson effectively
eviscerates privacy in prison. The majority attributes to all prisoners a
level of antisocial conduct and violence so high as to command unlim-
ited access to their cells.88 As the dissent points out, in justifying such
access, the majority presumes the reasonableness of all conduct by
guards.89 The Court opens the door to the elimination of privacy in
all areas of a prison and in all aspects of prison life when it holds that
traditional Fourth Amendment privacy is "fundamentally incompati-
ble with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells
required to ensure institutional security and internal order."'
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Hudson categorically exempts
searches of prisoners' cells from the ambit of the Fourth Amend-
ment.91 In O'Connor's view, persons incarcerated after an arrest or
conviction forfeit as a class "all legitimate Fourth Amendment privacy
and possessory interests in personal effects."92 Citing two instances in
which the Court moved in the direction of a blanket determination of
reasonableness rather than a case-by-case determination, O'Connor
argues that cell searches and seizures merit categorical treatment.93
87 "Our holding that respondent does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
enabling him to invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment does not mean that he is
without a remedy for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs. Nor does it mean that
prison attendants can ride roughshod over inmates' property rights with impunity. The Eighth
Amendment always stands as a protection against 'cruel and unusual punishments.' By the same
token, there are adequate state tort and common-law remedies available to respondent to
redress the alleged destruction of his personal property. " Id. at 530.
88 See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526.
89 "Today's holding cannot be squared with the text of the Constitution, nor with common
sense. The Fourth Amendment is of 'general application,' and its text requires that every search
or seizure of 'papers and effects' be evaluated for its reasonableness. The Court's refusal to
inquire into the reasonableness of official conduct whenever a prisoner is involved-its conclu-
sive presumption that all searches and seizures of prisoners' property are reasonable-can be
squared neither with the constitutional text, nor with the reality, acknowledged by the Court,
that our prison system is less than ideal." Id. at 555-56 (Stevens, J. concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, joined by Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.).
90 Id. at 527-28 (emphasis added).
91 See id. at 537-40.
92 Id. at 538.
93 "The Fourth Amendment 'reasonableness' determination is generally conducted on a
case-by-case basis, with the Court weighing the asserted governmental interests against the par-
ticular invasion of the individual's privacy and possessory interests as established by the facts of
the case. In some contexts, however, the Court has rejected the case-by-case approach to the
'reasonableness' inquiry in favor of an approach that determines the reasonableness of contested
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This blanket exemption sharply departs from the earlier view that
necessities of incarceration justifying limitations of prisoners' rights
should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Hudson left open the possibility that the prisoner's body itself
might lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, in a
case where a body (rather than a cell) search policy was at issue, the
maverick Seventh Circuit read Hudson expansively for the proposi-
tion that prisoners no longer retain a right of privacy in their bodies
under the Fourth Amendment. In the words of the Circuit Court,
[Bell v.] Wolfish assumed without deciding that prisoners retain some
right of privacy under the [F]ourth [A]mendment. Five years later the
Court held that they do not. Hudson v. Palmer observes that privacy
is the thing most surely extinguished by a judgment committing some-
one to prison. Guards take control of where and how prisoners live;
[prisoners] do not retain any right of seclusion or secrecy against their
captors, who are entitled to watch and regulate every detail of daily
life. 94
By eliminating the Fourth Amendment as a source of privacy in the
prisoner's body, the Seventh Circuit requires prisoners to meet a
much higher Eighth Amendment standard to successfully challenge
cross-gender searches. In other words, a prisoner must prove that the
search constitutes an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. A
federal court has reached this conclusion in only one cross-gender
search case; one in which the prisoner searched was female.95
practices in a categorical fashion. For the reasons stated by the Court, I agree that the govern-
ment's compelling interest in prison safety, together with the necessarily ad hoc judgments
required of prison officials, make prison cell searches and seizures appropriate for categorical
treatment." Id. at 537-38 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)
(prison room search and body cavity search rules); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973) (searches incident to lawful custodial arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
94 Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
95 See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (involving clothed body
searches conducted by male guards at the Washington Corrections Center for Women). Pursu-
ant to prison policy, a guard would randomly stop a female prisoner, run his hands over her
entire body from head to toe, squeezing and kneading her breasts, probing her crotch by press-
ing the flat of the hand against her genitals, and squeezing and kneading seams in her crotch
area. The impact on the female prisoners searched-most of whom had histories of violent
sexual abuse-was severe. One women clung to the bars of a nearby cell so tightly during the
search that her fingers had to be pried loose. Many women vomited and exhibited signs of
shock.
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Finally, Turner v. Safley,96 although decided outside the context
of Fourth Amendment searches, is particularly restrictive in its appli-
cation to privacy. In Turner, prisoners challenged regulations restrict-
ing inmates' ability to marry97 and correspond with other inmates. 98
In a 5-4 decision upholding the correspondence regulation and strik-
ing down the marriage rule, the Supreme Court articulated a rational
basis test for all infringements of prisoners' constitutional rights. Prior
to the Turner decision, different levels of scrutiny were applied to var-
ious challenges to prison regulations and practices alleged to infringe
the constitutional rights of prisoners. 99
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, synthesized the vari-
ous principles applied in a series of First Amendment cases to arrive
at a single standard for reviewing all prisoners' constitutional claims:
prison regulations which restrict prisoners' constitutional rights are
valid if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
She contends that this rational basis standard is necessary to ensure
that courts afford prison managers the kind of deference they require
to "anticipate security problems and adopt innovative solutions to the
intractable problems of prison administration. '"100 Factors relevant to
the determination of reasonableness include: (1) a legitimate govern-
mental interest not connected to the content of expression; (2) a
rational, valid connection between the rule and the governmental
interest put forward to justify it; (3) the availability of alternative
96 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
97 The marriage regulation prohibited inmates from marrying other inmates or civilians
unless the Superintendent approved the marriage after finding that there were "compelling rea-
sons" for doing so. Generally, only pregnancy or the birth of a child was considered compelling.
See id.
98 The correspondence regulation barred inmates in one Missouri correctional facility from
corresponding with inmates at a different facility. See id.
99 For example, regulations infringing upon prisoners' First Amendment rights to free
speech were required to further an important or substantial governmental interest and be nar-
rowly drawn to further that interest. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (noting that
rules broadly restricting the content of inmate correspondence were invalidated where not found
to be necessary to the furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest). Regulations restricting
the receipt of incoming mail were judged by the higher "strict scrutiny" standard because they
implicate the free speech rights of those who are not incarcerated. Id. However, regulations
restricting prisoners' First Amendment rights to free association were judged by a lower "reason-
ableness" standard due to the limitations on association inherent in incarceration. See Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (noting that rules inhibiting the
activities of prisoner labor union upheld as reasonable and consistent with the legitimate opera-
tional considerations of the correctional facility).
100 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
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means of exercising the right; (4) the impact of accommodating the
right on guards, prisoners and resources;0 1 and (5) the absence of
obvious, easy alternatives.02
This consolidated approach to the diverse body of prisoners' con-
stitutional claims strikes particularly hard in the area of privacy. After
Turner, whenever a warden asserts a security-based justification for
restricting prisoners' privacy, it is presumptively reasonable. Since
surveillance is inherently linked to security, an unreasonable search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment must be so outrageous and unjus-
tified as to be malicious and sadistic, and conducted for the sole pur-
pose of causing harm. Thus, the standard for an unreasonable search
has begun to approach the rigorous Eighth Amendment standard for
cruel and unusual punishment. 10 3 And as the dissent points out, Tur-
ner reduces the actual showing the judiciary demands of prison offi-
cials in order to uphold regulations restricting the exercise of
constitutional rights in prison." Again, by its unitary approach to the
constitutional claims of inmates, the Turner opinion typifies the
retreat from judicial determination of the necessities of incarceration
on a case-by-case basis and the increasing treatment of prisoners as an
unindividuated, dangerous class of persons undeserving of a more
nuanced determination of the scope of their constitutional rights.
The Turner "rational basis" test has been the controlling prece-
dent for cross-gender search cases since 1987. Because it prioritizes
maintaining internal security and mandates deference to the judg-
ments of prison officials, it has done little to encourage courts to con-
sider the broader context of sexual intimidation and domination in
determining the propriety of cross-gender searches. In its zeal to pre-
vent federal judges from second-guessing the judgements of prison
101 The Court counseled particular deference to the "informed discretion" of guards when
accommodating a right will have a significant "ripple effect" on prisoners and staff. Id. at 90.
102 Ready alternatives would be evidence that prison officials had exaggerated their
response to their concerns. However, any alternative that imposes more than a de minimis cost
on the correctional facility or on the pursuit of correctional goals need not be considered. Fur-
thermore, the Court is careful to point out that the principle of questioning the availability of
ready alternatives (as evidence of reasonableness) does not constitute a "least restrictive means"
test. Id. at 83.
103 See generally Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
104 "Application of the standard would seem to permit disregard for inmates' constitutional
rights whenever the imagination of the warden produces a plausible security concern and a def-
erential trial court is able to discern a logical connection between that concern and the chal-
lenged regulation." 482 U.S. at 100-01.
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administrators, Turner overlooks the fact that while security may be
well within the expertise of prison authorities, gender differences, sex
roles and the equitable treatment of members of the opposite sex are
not. Indeed, prison officials frequently collude-maliciously or
benevolently-in the sexual intimidation and violence that orders
power among male prisoners. Yet, courts are presently required to
accept whatever policy-based rationale prison administrators give for
permitting or prohibiting cross-gender searches of prisoners' bodies as
long as it is facially linked to a valid penological objective: security,
deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, or even the efficient use of
security staff.
In sum, Katz limited the right of privacy of the criminally accused
to those expectations society recognizes as "reasonable." Bell carried
the Katz analysis into prisons, recognizing that prisoners have a lim-
ited right of privacy, but giving prison officials virtually unchecked dis-
cretion to invade that privacy by performing highly invasive searches
on prisoners, as long as the basis for the search, and the manner in
which it is conducted, is reasonable. Hudson completely eliminated
the application of the Fourth Amendment within a prison cell, con-
cluding that society does not recognize as reasonable any expectation
of privacy a prisoner may have in his cell. The decision left open the
effect that this new standard would have on the scope of a prisoner's
right to privacy on his own body, both inside and outside the prison
cell. Finally, Turner established a reasonableness standard of review
for all infringements upon prisoners' fundamental constitutional
rights, requiring only the barest connection between the limitation of
the right and a governmental interest justifying the limitation, and
affording great deference to the judgements of prison authorities.
The clear mandate of the Bell, Hudson and Turner cases is that
searches of even a highly intrusive nature are permissible under the
Fourth Amendment. Over the past twenty years federal courts have
applied the declining privacy protections of Katz, Hudson, and Bell,
and the heightened standards for judicial scrutiny of prisoners' consti-
tutional claims in Turner to a vast array of disputes over searches of
prisoners' bodies. The standard that has evolved for resolving these
disputes gives broad discretion to prison officials to subject prisoners
to routine, random, suspicionless searches of a highly intrusive nature
without transgressing the Constitution. As the Seventh Circuit found
in a recent case: "given the considerable deference prison officials
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enjoy to run their institutions it is difficult to conjure up too many
real-life scenarios where [even highly intrusive] prison strip searches
of inmates could be said to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment."1 °5 Indeed judges need only conclude that the search bears
some rational relation to maintaining security in order to pass Fourth
Amendment scrutiny.10 6 This standard functionally excludes all but a
negligible amount of searches conducted solely for the purpose of
harassment.
Lower federal courts have uniformly adhered to this mandate in
deciding cases challenging the search authority of guards. They have
rejected challenges to many types of highly invasive searches of pris-
oners' bodies conducted randomly and without suspicion of wrongdo-
ing. Prison officials are free to search prisoners' body fluids without
any suspicion of misconduct. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits and vari-
ous district courts have held that involuntary blood tests of inmates
for the purpose of DNA testing do not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.107 Similarly, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have condoned
non-consensual AIDS testing of prisoners' blood.1°8
Prisoners' challenges to random, suspicionless searches of their
body cavities run aground on the receding tide of Fourth Amendment
protection. Since Bell, Hudson and Turner were decided, at least five
federal courts of appeals have ruled on the constitutionality of strip
searches and body cavity searches. The Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth
and Tenth Circuits have affirmed the constitutionality of routine suspi-
cionless body cavity and strip searches on prisoners, according wide-
ranging deference to the experience and expertise of prison officials in
determining the appropriateness of these searches. 109
105 Peckham v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 1998).
106 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 100.
107 See generally Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d
302 (4th Cir. 1992); Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583 (D. Minn. 1995); Ryncarz v.
Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp. 1493 (E.D. Wash. 1993); Gilbert v. Peters, Nos. 930-C-20012, 92-C-
20354, 1994 WL 369643 (N.D. I11. June 28, 1994) (unreported decision).
108 See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989). However, the Eleventh Circuit has
held that the scope of a prisoner's constitutional right of privacy extends to prohibiting non-
consensual disclosure of the results of HIV tests. See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1512
(11th Cir. 1991).
109 See Peckham v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 1998); Harris v.
Rocchio, 132 F.3d 42 (10th Cir. 1997) (strip search of prisoner alleged to be in possession of
unauthorized paperwork withstood Fourth Amendment scrutiny); Swepston v. Hargett, 124 F.3d
217 (10th Cir. 1997) (court declined to second guess judgment of prison officials who conducted
digital search of prisoner's rectum during the investigation of a suspected escape attempt);
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When prison officials perceive the need for heightened security
procedures due to potential or actual disruption or unrest, they are
given even greater latitude to perform highly invasive searches. For
example, in Elliott v. Lynn, an inmate subjected to a visual body cavity
search in the general presence of other inmates, guards and non-
essential personnel including media representatives as part of an insti-
tution-wide "shakedown," brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the inappropriate manner and place of the search vio-
lated his Fourth Amendment right to privacy.1 The Fifth Circuit held
that the measures taken were reasonable in light of the fact that
prison administrators were to be accorded "great deference and flexi-
bility" in responding to increased incidents of murders, suicides, stab-
bings and cuttings among the prison population. " '
Under the diminished privacy regime within prison, only a nar-
row category of highly intrusive searches is considered "unreasona-
ble" under the Fourth Amendment. Included in this category are
highly intrusive searches performed unprofessionally, unhygeni-
cally,112 abusively or purely for the purpose of harassment. 13 Those
searches are both unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and
violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment when they are conducted purely for the purpose of harass-
ment or the unnecessary or wanton infliction of pain.
B. The Supreme Court Has Provided Little Guidance to Federal
Courts Regarding Searches by Opposite Sex Guards.
When the basis of challenges to the search authority of guards is a
gender difference between guard and prisoner, the Supreme Court
provides little guidance to lower federal courts. The seminal Supreme
Court cases, which have broadened the authority of prison officials to
Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 1997) (visual body cavity search and nonrandom,
compelled urinalysis test found to be permissible under the Fourth Amendment); Elliott v. Lynn,
38 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1994) (visual body cavity search in presence of others is reasonable);
Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting random, suspicionless visual body cavity
search of pre-trail detainee commingled with sentenced inmates found to satisfy the Turner test).
110 38 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1994).
111 Id. at 191.
112 See Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164 (1st Cir. 1986).
113 See Watson v. Jones, 980 F.2d 1165 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting factual allegations that a
female correctional officer made sexual advances in pat-down search, including tickling and
deliberately examining male prisoner's genital, anal, lower stomach and thigh area sufficient to
preclude summary judgment for the officer on Fourth Amendment claim).
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search prisoners, have left open the legal significance of the gender of
the guard and prisoner. The searches at issue in Katz, Bell, and Hud-
son were not cross-gender searches. Moreover, the Court did not
address the significance of the sex, either within the main body of the
opinions or in dicta.114
Even when directly presented with the opportunity to address the
constitutional dimensions of cross-gender searches, the Supreme
Court has declined to do so. On at least four separate occasions, the
Court has denied certiorari to review the opinions of lower federal
courts directly on point.115
In Dothard v. Rawlison, the single instance where the Supreme
Court discussed sexuality and coercion in the context of cross-gender
guarding, the employment rights of women-not the privacy rights of
prisoners-were at issue.116 In considering the constitutionality of
barriers to women's employment in contact positions in the men's
prisons, the Supreme Court focused on the sexual vulnerability of
female guards, neither acknowledging nor discussing the sexual vul-
nerability of male prisoners.
In Dothard, a twenty-two year old woman with an undergraduate
degree in correctional psychology - Dianne Rawlinson - applied to
the Alabama Board of Corrections for a job as a prison guard and was
rejected. Subsequently, she challenged the constitutionality of mini-
mum statutory height and weight requirements for employment as a
guard, as well as an Regulation 204, an administrative rule adopted
during the lawsuit, which barred women from working in contact posi-
tions in men's maximum security prisons. 17
114 The Turner case did not involve a search at all. Rather Turner determined the constitu-
tionality of restrictions of prisoner correspondence and marriage regulations. Because the
Supreme Court explicitly applied the scope of the holding in Turner to all constitutional claims
of prisoners, the standard articulated in Turner is central to all Fourth Amendment based chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of prison searches.
115 See Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 852 (1997); John-
son v. Sheahan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, see 519 U.S. 1006 (1996); Tharp v. Iowa
Dep't of Corrections, 68 F.3d 223 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1135 (1996); Smith v.
Fairman, 461 U.S. 907 (1983).
116 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1979).
117 Alabama Administrative Regulation 204 established gender criteria for assigning cor-
rectional officers to maximum-security institutions for contact positions. Contact positions were
defined as positions requiring continual close physical proximity to inmates of the institution.
Rawlinson amended her complaint to challenge Regulation 204 on the ground that it violated
Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 324-29 n.6 (citing ALA. ADMIN. CODE R.
204).
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Although it affirmed the district court's elimination of the mini-
mum height and weight requirements, the Supreme Court reversed
the invalidation of Regulation 204. The Court concluded that the rule
constituted a bona fide occupational qualification, even though it
explicitly discriminated against women, and excluded women from
75% of the available positions as prison guards in the State of Ala-
bama. 118 The rule was therefore exempt from the general prohibition
on sex-based discrimination under Title VII. The Court found that
the potential for sexual violence directed toward female guards justi-
fied making maleness a criterion of employment in the Alabama State
Penitentiary.119 The majority stated:
[m]ore is at stake in this case, however, than an individual woman's
decision to weigh and accept the risks of employment in a "contact"
position in a maximum-security male prison. The essence of a correc-
tional counselor's job is to maintain prison security. A woman's rela-
tive ability to maintain order in a male, maximum-security,
unclassified penitentiary of the type Alabama now runs could be
directly reduced by her womanhood. There is a basis in fact for
expecting that sex offenders who have criminally assaulted women in
the past would be moved to do so again if access to women were
established within the prison. There would also be a real risk that
other inmates, deprived of a normal heterosexual environment, would
assault women guards because they are women.
120
At first glance, the above excerpt from Dothard looks fairly
insightful. Rather than ignore the connection between physiological
sex and violence as do many judges confronted with cross-gender
searches, the Dothard majority highlights it. Indeed, Dothard became
the first federal case to discuss the connection between sexuality and
violence in a case dealing with the supervision of prisoners by oppo-
site sex guards. However, upon further examination, it is clear that
Justice Stewart's discussion of sexual violence is stereotyped. His
opinion views women as sexually vulnerable and men as sexually
dominant, regardless of the status of the individual at the top or the
118 See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333 n.16.
119 See id. at 335.
120 Id. at 335-36.
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bottom of the prison disciplinary apparatus.121 Stewart suggests that
sexually deprived prisoners would sexually assault female guards
"because they were women," as if mere physical proximity to a female
guard triggers an assault.122 Stewart's focus on the sexual vulnerability
of women guards overlooks the possibility that male prisoners can be
victims of both sexual coercion by fellow prisoners and custodial sex-
ual misconduct by guards-even female guards. Dothard's singular
emphasis on the sexual vulnerability of women-even when they are
clothed in the substantial authority of the State-is a stereotyped
treatment of women that (1) ignores the male-on-male sexual assault
which is endemic and pervasive within men's prisons, and (2) ignores
the coercion inherent in donning a badge and a uniform.
Dothard has been criticized for its unprecedented expansion of
what was designed to be an extremely narrow exception to the law
forbidding sex discrimination. The same result could have been justi-
fied on the basis that prisoners' privacy interests outweighed the
employment interests of female guards seeking employment in con-
tact positions. However, as one commentator suggested, the Court
was not willing to expand prisoner rights in exchange for a more credi-
ble defense of Regulation 204.123 Additionally, one can understand
the Court's reluctance to base its decision on the privacy doctrine
rather than employment discrimination law when one considers the
hard blow the Supreme Court dealt to prisoners' privacy rights less
than two years later in Bell v. Wolfish.
Dothard illustrates at least one major flaw in the doctrine of
cross-gender searches. 124 The Supreme Court's focus on the sexual
121 "The likelihood that inmates would assault a woman because she was a woman would
pose a real threat not only to the victim of the assault [presumed to be a woman] but also to the
basic control of the penitentiary and protection of its inmates and the other security personnel.
The employee's very womanhood would thus directly undermine her capacity to provide the
security that is the essence of a correctional counselor's responsibility." Id. at 336.
122 Id. at 335.
123 "One suspects that the Court was not anxious to resolve [Dothard v.1 Rawlinson by
recognizing a privacy right or interest, despite the fact that such a position might have been more
defensible than the one the Court actually took." Female Guards in Men's Prisons, in JAMES B.
JACOBS, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT (1983).
124 Although Dothard has been characterized as limited in its influence due to the
extraordinary danger inherent in working as an Alabama State Penitentiary corrections officer,
at the time, prison conditions have deteriorated so in the past twenty years that the circum-
stances described in the case-lack of firmly established control over the inmate population,
sexual offenders in general population, understaffing and overcrowding-are hardly remarkable.
See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335-36.
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victimization of women guards in the context of discussing sex and
power in prison established a theme whose influence can be observed
in later cross-gender search cases that focus on the difference in the
sex of the searcher and the searched, but ignore male prisoners' vul-
nerability to sexual assault by guards and fellow prisoners.
C. Federal Law Regulating Cross-Gender Searches in Prison is in
Disarray.
The constitutionality of cross-gender searches is not settled law
today and has not been for years. Federal courts acknowledge this
confusion when they consider the qualified immunity claims of correc-
tional officers sued in their personal capacities by prisoners subjected
to cross-gender searches. The doctrine of qualified immunity is an
affirmative defense that protects government officials from liability
for civil damages where the officials could reasonably believe that
their conduct did not violate clearly established rights.125 The Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits have affirmed decisions granting qualified
immunity to correctional officers who searched prisoners of the oppo-
site sex.
1 26
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Keith Somers, a pris-
oner subjected to surveillance while showering and visual body cavity
searches by female guards, did not prove that his right to be free from
cross-gender searches had been clearly established. 127 Thus, the court
reversed the holding of the district court, finding that: "[t]he Supreme
Court had not spoken definitively on [the] issue [in 1993 and 1994],
nor has it today [1997]. "128 In Hudson v. Palmer,12 9 Judge Trott criti-
cized the Supreme Court decision for its dicta, which obfuscated the
privacy analysis by failing to clarify whether prisoners retained any
Fourth Amendment rights against body searches or whether their only
recourse was under the Eighth Amendment.130 In Fortner v.
125 When qualified immunity is claimed, courts must determine whether the law was clearly
established at the time the defendant committed the alleged improper acts.
126 See Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 1997); Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024
(11th Cir. 1993). But cf. Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164 (1st Cir. 1986) (denying qualified immunity
for same-sex body cavity searches conducted by prison guards on basis that female prisoners had
"clearly established" Fourth Amendment right to be free of body cavity searches conducted in
conjunction with general security search of prison).
127 See Somers, 109 F.3d at 620.
128 Id. at 617.
129 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
130 See Somers, 109 F.3d at 617-18.
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Thomas, 3' the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court decision
granting the defendant's, a correctional officer, motion to dismiss
based on qualified immunity from suit for monetary damages. The
appellate court agreed that the Court or the Eleventh Circuit had not
recognized a prisoner's right to bodily privacy.'3 2  Likewise, in
Csizmadia v. Fauver,33 a New Jersey district court found that federal
cross-gender search cases had reached "disparate and contradictory
results, 134 making it impossible to establish that a correctional policy
permitting female guards to patrol housing units where they might see
male prisoners naked while showering, toileting, or undressing was
clearly unlawful in 1989.13 The frequency with which federal courts
have granted or affirmed granting qualified immunity to prison
guards, who conducted cross-gender searches, attests to the absence of
clear guidelines regarding the significance of gender in analyzing the
privacy aspects of prisoner searches.
The case law has been criticized as lacking both uniformity and
consistency and for its confusing doctrinal framework.'36 Although
Hudson'37 did not address the privacy rights that prisoners retain
outside their cells, the Court's decisions in that case138 and in Bell,139
and Turner 14 ° clearly articulate a diminished scope of privacy in
prison.14' However, the Court has provided little guidance to lower
federal courts on the impact of cross-gender searches on prisoners'
131 983 F.2d 1024, 1030, 1032 (lth Cir. 1993).
132 See id. at 1028. In Fortner, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that prisoners retain a con-
stitutional right to bodily privacy. While qualified immunity protected prison officials from lia-
bility for damages arising prior to the Fortner decision, it did not protect them from prisoners'
claims for injunctive relief. See id. at 1030, 1032.
133 746 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.J. 1990).
134 Id. at 490.
135 See id. at 485.
136 See Mary Ann Farkas & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Female Correctional Officers and Prisoner
Privacy, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 995, 1029 (1997) ("Court decisions regarding prisoner privacy and
cross-gender searches are all over the board, making it difficult for prison management to accu-
rately take into account any potential liability and act accordingly. The failure of courts to ana-
lyze prisoner privacy claims uniformly has effectively limited employment opportunities for
female correctional officers); Phillip E. Friduss & Ellen Gendernalik, Update on Fourth Amend-
ment Search Cases: the New and Confused Framework, 28 URn. LAW. 679, 696-98 (1996).
137 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
138 See id. at 524 ("imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many signifi-
cant rights").
139 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
140 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987) ("We hold that a lesser standard of scrutiny is
appropriate in determining the constitutionality of the prison rules.").
141 See supra Part III.A.
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privacy rights. While the Court has had the opportunity to provide
standards or broad principles to guide lower courts, it has not done so.
Consequently, despite the large number of privacy-based challenges
to cross-gender searches, federal courts have produced a body of case
law that lacks uniformity and have failed to articulate a single consti-
tutional standard.
Cross-gender search cases generally arise out of one of two scena-
rios in which conflicting rights must be resolved. In the first, more
common scenario, prisoners invoke their right to privacy by challeng-
ing "gender neutral" policies established by prison administrators,
which permit both male and female guards to perform searches rang-
ing from highly invasive strip searches and body cavity searches to less
invasive searches such as pat frisks and visual surveillance of prisoners
engaged in bodily functions. In the second scenario, prison guards
invoke their right to equal employment opportunities in order to chal-
lenge "gender specific" employment policies limiting the scope of
their duties with respect to prisoners of the opposite sex. 42 Both male
142 In general, female guards are disproportionately burdened by same sex search policies.
This disadvantage - to which female guards employed in both men's and women's prisons are
subject - is a function of the meager representation of women as correctional officers. On
January 1, 1998, women comprised only 20.3% of line correctional staff in state and federal
correctional facilities nationally (excluding the District of Columbia and U.S. territories). See
1998 CORREC-TIONS YEARBOOK 135 (Am. Correctional Assoc. 1999). A total of 30,743 women
(82.1% of all female correctional officers) were assigned to men's state and federal facilities. See
id. at 136. A same sex search restriction in men's prisons excludes female guards from high
security areas where searches are routinely and frequently performed; reduces their authority
over male prisoners; and curtails their professional development (because they are not allowed
to master a valuable and necessary job skill). A same sex search restriction in women's prisons
often has the same impact. Women compose 30% of the prison guards in state prisons for
women, based on the national average. See Barbara Vobejda, Report: Female Inmates Subjected
to Sexual Abuse; Male Guards' Misconduct a Common Practice, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 5, 1999,
at 19. However, the American Correctional Association estimates that only 7,388 female correc-
tional officers (17.9% of all female correctional officers) were assigned to female facilities. In
order to fulfil the requirements of a same sex search policy, this small group of female guards are
spread so thinly across the population that they spend most of their time on duty performing
searches, rather than practicing the full range of employment skills. And in spite of the fact that
the one skill they are allowed to hone is highly valued in general, the ability to search a female
prisoner is not as highly valued as the ability to search a male prisoner. There are at least two
reasons for this. First, male prisoners are generally considered more dangerous, thus requiring
more advanced search skills. Second, the vast majority of positions for guards are in men's
prisons; therefore, skill in search male prisoners is in greater demand.
Male guards challenge same sex search policies for different reasons. Same sex search poli-
cies in women's prisons often entail more minimal restrictions on the employment of male
guards, such as rearrangement of work shifts, limitations of duty assignments within the facility,
and infringements on seniority. For example, in Tharp v. Iowa Department of Corrections, a co-
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and female guards have filed lawsuits to overturn gender restrictions
on assignments and duties, including "female only" and "male only"
shift assignments, geographic restrictions on the employment of oppo-
site sex guards within correctional facilities, prohibitions against cer-
tain cross-gender searches and requirements that guards obtain
consent for certain searches of prisoners of the opposite sex.
Courts have resolved each of these conflicts in a variety of ways.
The general trend has shifted from mutual accommodation of privacy
and employment rights consistent with the interest-balancing
approach in Bell, 43 to only partially accommodating prisoner privacy
or overriding privacy claims entirely when the basis for the underlying
policy is internal security or equal opportunity employment. Never-
theless, judicial resolution of these conflicts remains inconsistent in
many respects.
The degree of invasiveness of cross-gender searches is probative,
but does not always determine the constitutionality of the search.
Federal judges appear to be less comfortable sanctioning searches of
prisoners conducted by, or in the presence of guards of the opposite
sex. This discomfort is particularly acute when the type of search is
highly intrusive involving manual contact with breasts, genitalia, and
anal areas.144 Nevertheless, highly intrusive cross-gender searches are
not uniformly prohibited. Some courts have condoned strip searches
in the presence of guards of the opposite sex, particularly when secur-
ed minimum security facility in Des Moines, with two male units and one female unit, adopted a
policy of assigning only female security staff to the women's unit. The same sex guarding policy
was adopted to alleviate the problem of having too few female security staff available to conduct
searches on female residents of the facility and to provide more positive role models for the
female residents. The new policy made four of the sixteen shifts available only to female guards.
The two guards with the greatest seniority, both male, challenged the policy because the shifts
they bid on were assigned to female guards with less seniority. At stake was their first choice of
shifts based upon seniority, not their ability to perform an important job duty. See Tharp v. Iowa
Dep't of Corrections, 68 F.3d 23 (8th Cir. 1995). Similarly, in Forts v. Ward, male guards in the
sole maximum security women's prison in the State of New York challenged-through their
union-a court order enjoining male guards from duty assignments "requiring observation of
female inmates through the windows of their cell doors during nighttime hours." The same sex
nighttime surveillance order was issued in response to a suit brought by prisoners at Bedford
Hills, complaining that male guards were observing them nude and partially nude while shower-
ing, toileting and sleeping. See Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1980).
143 441 U.S. at 560.
144 See Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994); Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954
(7th Cir. 1983); Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982) (explaining Sterling v. Cupp, 625
P.2d 123 (Or. 1981) (en banc)) (distinguishing a search conducted in close proximity to genitalia
or even grazing genitalia from one entailing a deliberate search of the genital area).
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ity concerns are heightened. 45 Thus, while some courts have upheld
highly invasive cross-gender searches, others have determined that the
more invasive the search, the more offensive it is to have personnel of
the opposite sex conduct the search.
Courts accord vastly different legal significance to the frequency
and deliberateness with which guards observe the naked bodies of
prisoners of the opposite sex. Some courts have found that a pris-
oner's right to privacy is violated when guards of the opposite sex fre-
quently and regularly observe the prisoner partially or completely
nude while engaging in intimate activities such as showering, toileting,
changing clothes, being searched or undergoing a medical examina-
tion. 146 Courts that take this view have upheld a variety of searches
conducted by or in the presence of guards of the opposite sex when
exposure to naked prisoners is incidental or infrequent.
1 47
Other courts have found frequent and regular exposure of unclad
prisoners to guards of the opposite sex constitutionally sound. t4 8 The
Seventh Circuit has held that neither the Fourth, Eighth nor Four-
teenth Amendments is abridged when female guards frequently and
deliberately observe male prisoners undressed when showering, toilet-
ing, and changing clothes. 149 Indeed the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
frequent and deliberate observation of male prisoners in states of
undress by female guards is requisite to their employment on a non-
discriminatory basis.150
145 See Letcher v. Turner, 968 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the presence of female
guards during a strip search of a male prisoner did not to violate a prisoner's right of privacy
where organized disturbance had just occurred); Jones v. Harrison, 864 F. Supp. 166 (D. Kan.
1994) (holding that the presence of a female officer during strip search of a male prisoner
believed to be a participant in a potentially violent disturbance did not violate prisoner's
privacy).
146 See Johnson v. Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections, 661 F. Supp. 425, 431 (W.D. Pa.
1987); Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890 (D. Md. 1980) (routine and regular exposure of
nude prisoners by opposite sex guards was held to violate the Fourth Amendment); Kuntz v.
Wilson, 33 F.3d 59 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion).
147 The Ninth Circuit takes this view. See Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 491 (9th Cir.
1985); Grummet v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Chrans, 629 F. Supp. 606 (C.D.
Ill. 1986). Rodriguez v. Hall, 19 F.3d 29 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion) (use of female
guards to supervise showering male inmates and observe strip searches of male prisoners did not
violate prisoners' Fourth Amendment right to privacy).
148 See Bagley v. Watson, 579 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Or. 1983).
149 See Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995).
150 See id. at 147 ("if only men can monitor showers, then female guards are less useful to
the prison ... [An] interest in efficient deployment of staff supports cross-sex monitoring").
[Vol. 10:2
SEX & SURVEILLANCE
Some courts focus on the degree to which the guard's view of the
prisoner's nude body is restricted or unrestricted. In Bowling v.
Enimoto,1 ' a prisoner in the protective custody unit of the all-male
Soledad Prison challenged the assignment of female guards to his unit.
The plaintiff was housed in a 6-by-10 foot cell with a cell door that was
solid save for four 5.5-by-8.5 inch windows that permitted viewing the
entire interior of the cell, including the toilet and the bed. Prison reg-
ulations forbade covering the windows "for any purpose at any time"
so that guards could conduct continuous unannounced surveillance.152
While the district court declined to prohibit the assignment of female
officers to the protective custody unit, it held that prisoners have the
"right to be free from unrestricted observation of their genitals and
bodily functions by prison officials of the opposite sex" under non-
emergency conditions.5 3
A similar decision was reached in Forts v. Ward,154 where prison-
ers in the all-female Bedford Hills Correctional Facility challenged a
policy permitting the assignment of male guards to areas of the prison
where they could observe partially or fully undressed prisoners receiv-
ing medical treatment in the prison infirmary, showering, toileting, or
sleeping in the housing units. While the Second Circuit vacated the
prohibition of the nighttime assignment of male guards to dormitory
areas, it affirmed the requirement of installing translucent screens to
obstruct the view of shower areas and approved the amendment of
prison rules to permit inmates to cover the window of their cells dur-
ing toileting and dressing.
155
Some judges have concluded that this accommodation is required
by the Fourth Amendment when guards patrol the living areas of pris-
oners of the opposite sex.156 Privacy panels are a common solution
151 514 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
152 Id. at 202.
153 Id. at 204. At least two factors suggest that this case might be decided differently today.
At the time, the practice complained of violated the California Department of Corrections' own
administrative rule prohibiting assigning officers to areas where "a substantial portion of the
duties include observation or search of unclothed persons of the opposite sex." Id. at 203. The
rule violation may have significantly influenced the court's decision. Furthermore, the case of
Hudson v. Palmer was subsequently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court eliminating the applica-
tion of the Fourth Amendment to prison cells and casting into doubt the existence of a prisoner's
right of bodily privacy. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
154 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
155 See id. at 1216.
156 See Bowling, 514 F. Supp. at 203-04, following Forts, 621 F.2d 1210.
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because they allow temporary obstruction of guards' view while pris-
oners are using the toilet or dressing. Others have found this accom-
modation unnecessary.
157
Still other courts have found that a single incident involving view-
ing of a naked prisoner by members of the opposite sex is sufficient to
constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. In Hayes v. Marriott, the
Tenth Circuit held that a male prisoner subjected to a body cavity
search "in the presence of over 100 people, including female secretar-
ies and case managers" on only one occasion had established a mate-
rial issue of fact precluding summary judgment in favor of defendant
prison officials.158
D. Confusion Within the Cross-Gender Search Doctrine Centers on
Visual Surveillance of Unclad Prisoners by Guards of the
Opposite Sex.
The disarray among federal courts centers on the assignment of
security personnel of the opposite sex to perform less intrusive, non-
tactile searches. These searches provoke a considerable amount of
prisoner litigation and garner the least consensus among federal
courts. Where consensus does exist, it is not with respect to cross-
gender visual surveillance, but in the more extreme cases of tactile,
hands on searches. There is consensus among federal courts that
deliberate cross-gender touching of prisoners' genital, breast and anal
areas violates the Fourth Amendment. Even under the diminished
privacy regime of Hudson,159 manual contact with genitalia, anus and
breasts violates the Fourth Amendment.
So why do courts find it easier to agree about the more intrusive
cross-gender searches? In part, because tactile searches raise a differ-
ent set of practical issues. Most state departments of corrections take
the initiative by promulgating regulations that prohibit cross-gender
tactile searches of anal and genital areas. It is in the state's best inter-
est to impose limits on intimate cross-gender touching. Tactical cross-
gender searches are susceptible to abuse by prison guards. Establish-
ing administrative limitations on cross-gender searches reduces inci-
dents of sexual harassment and custodial sexual misconduct. Invasive
157 See Johnson v. Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections, 661 F. Supp. 425, 433 (W.D. Pa.
1987).
158 See Hayes v. Marriott, 70 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 1996).
159 468 U.S. 517.
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searches generate hostility and provoke assaults on guards even when
they are conducted by guards of the same sex as the prisoners.
Deploying guards of the opposite sex under these tense and volatile
circumstances simply fans the flames of prisoners' resentment.
Consequently, most states have resolved the issue legislatively by
adopting administrative regulations prohibiting tactile searches of sex-
ual and excretory orifices. Furthermore, courts have long recognized
a heightened privacy interest in being free from non-consensual con-
tact with one's sexual and excretory organs. The anal, genital, and
breast areas are considered the "final bastion of privacy' on the
human body."16 Accordingly, deliberate contact with those areas is
prohibited. 6' Incidental contact is discouraged, but distinguished as
legitimate in some instances.
162
Ironically, it is the least tactile and, what some might describe as
the least invasive form of prisoner search 163 that has occasioned the
most litigation and the least judicial consensus. Visual surveillance of
prisoners under circumstances in which they are exposed to physical
conduct by guards of the opposite sex complicates the Fourth Amend-
ment analysis because it involves other constitutional issues. First,
limiting surveillance in these so-called "contact positions" has a sub-
stantial negative impact on employment opportunities for female
guards. The majority of assignments for correctional officers are in
contact positions. Excluding women from contact positions relegates
women to a minor role in men's prisons and in the profession and
160 Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 55 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d
123, 132 (Or. 1981)).
161 The exception to the prohibition on deliberate contact with sexually private areas of the
body is the same exception that uniformly applies to all prison searches. Where prison officials
have heightened security concerns, courts have accorded them more latitude to utilize personnel
as they deem necessary. This includes having guards conduct searches on prisoners of the oppo-
site sex, including searches of private areas of the body. See Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 117 (4th
Cir. 1981). Cf Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1992).
162 See Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994) ("pat-down searches and occa-
sional or inadvertent sighting by female prison employees of inmates in their cells or open show-
ers do not violate the inmates' right to privacy"); Kuntz v. Wilson, 33 F.3d 59 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that district court properly dismissed complaint alleging "only a single isolated instance
in which a female correctional employee was able to observe him naked"); Michenfelder v. Sum-
ner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988) ("assigned positions of female guards that require only infre-
quent and casual observation ... and that are reasonably related to prison needs are not so
degrading as to warrant court interference"); Merritt-Bey v. Salts, 747 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Mo.
1990) (adopting the position of the Ninth Circuit that the presence of female guards during strip
searches does not violate prisoners' privacy rights").
163 See Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995).
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turns the sexual equality clock back several decades. t' The employ-
ment interests of guards is a high priority for correctional administra-
tors seeking maximum flexibility in deploying security personnel while
minimizing their exposure to legal liability for sex discrimination.
Consequently, prison officials are not inclined to adopt self-imposed
limitations on cross-gender visual surveillance. For these reasons, lim-
iting female guards' opportunities to visually observe male prisoners
in their living quarters has a much more significant impact on the sta-
tus of female guards than does limiting female guards' opportunities
to conduct intrusive hands-on searches.165
Second, surveillance is the cornerstone of punishment. It is the
type of search most frequently and unreservedly conducted in prison.
Challenging the authority of guards to visually monitor prisoners jeop-
ardizes the fundamental process of incarceration. Michel Foucault
described the introduction of surveillance-based incarceration into
prisons during the 17th and 18th centuries as a technological innova-
tion which improved the exercise of power over prisoners "by making
it lighter, more rapid, more effective ... [and] more subtle.' 66 Sur-
veillance uniquely disciplines without relying upon the use of force.
Instead, the prisoner participates in his own discipline through self-
censure. According to Foucault:
164 Prior to 1972, women were excluded from employment in men's prisons. Only after the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended in 1972 were female correctional officers placed in men's
prisons. The duties were initially limited to searching female visitors and administrative "front-
office" tasks. Only gradually were female guards assigned to more varied duties, including staff-
ing posts in the living quarters of male prisoners. See JOCELYN M. POLLOCK, SEX AND SUPERVI-
SION: GUARDING MALE AND FEMALE INMATES 8 (1986). A 1979 survey reported that only
29.3% of correctional staff were female, and that they were over-represented in clerical and
support functions. Only 41% had contact with prisoners. Female correctional officers have been
inordinately assigned to institutions for women and juveniles. All these restrictions on the pres-
ence of women in contract positions in men's prisons have contributed to female correctional
workers being limited to narrower career ladders, lower salaries and lower status compared to
their male counterparts. See JOCELYN M. POLLOCK, WOMEN, PRISON & CRIME 114-17 (1990).
165 In most maximum-security facilities for men, there remain discreet areas-usually for
the isolation and punishment of the most violent prisoners-to which women guards are not
assigned. There is little if any litigation of same sex guarding policies in these units. Prisoners
held in these units do not generally have access to clothing. Therefore, even surveillance, the
most passive form of guarding requires guards to deliberately and regularly observe naked pris-
oners. Under these circumstances, sex is a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ"). The
reservation of these same sex assignments doesn't require litigation under a BFOQ standard.
166 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 123-26, 209
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books, 2d ed. 1995) (1978).
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He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spon-
taneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of
his own subjection ... it is a perpetual victory that avoids any physical
confrontation and which is always decided in advance. 67
A guard's liberty to observe the prison population without reservation
or qualification is central to the effectiveness of the modern penal sys-
tem. In spite of a long history of physical abuse of prisoners at the
hands of guards, non-tactile and less physical searches by guards of
the opposite sex pose the greatest challenge to the cornerstone of cor-
rections. While correctional administrators, guards and prisoners
alike take into account the gravity of seemingly, more benign visual
searches, courts approach the issue with less uniformity.
E. Federal Judges Base Their Decisions about the Acceptability of
Cross-Gender Surveillance on Dramatically Different Views
of the Significance of Gender.
In deciding whether cross-gender surveillance is permissible, fed-
eral judges base their decisions on dramatically different views of the
significance of gender. For instance, in Canell v. Armenikis 168 the
District Court for the District of Oregon considered the gender of the
guard conducting the search to be irrelevant. The court weighed the
claims of male prisoners challenging the presence of female guards in
their living quarters, who-among other duties-monitored them
while undressing and performing bodily functions. On the basis of the
plaintiffs' sexually suggestive factual allegations, 69 the court defined
the scope of the issue as going beyond the mere determination of
whether the facts justified the search. Similar to the Court's opinion
in Dothard,17 ° the district court construed the issue before it as the
significance of gender to the duties of a prison guard, a question of
167 Id. at 202-03.
168 840 F. Supp. 783 (D. Or. 1993).
169 The male prisoners' claims included allegations that "deprived" female guards were
acting like "cats in a fish market" and that prison policies failed to "stop female guards from
shopping for male flesh." They further complained that one female guard "shopped around on
the tiers, found an admirer and passed notes and letters among other things." Id. at 783-84.
170 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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first impression within the Ninth Circuit.'71 The district court consid-
ered whether the Constitution prohibits a female guard from visually
monitoring unclothed male prisoners in circumstances in which the
identical conduct by a male guard would be proper. Granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court reasoned that as long
as the guard has sufficient justification to search the prisoner and con-
ducts the search professionally, the gender of the guard is irrelevant.
17 2
In contrast to Canell, in Timm v. Gunter, Senior Circuit Judge
Bright's dissent cautioned us not to ignore the differences between
men and women.17 3 In Timm, the Eighth Circuit reversed portions of
a district court order requiring the Nebraska State Penitentiary to
modify policies, schedules and architecture to accommodate the pri-
vacy of male prisoners subject to pat frisks and visual surveillance by
female guards. The Eighth Circuit concluded, inter alia, that pat frisks
and visual surveillance of male inmates by female guards, performed
on the same basis as identical searches of male prisoners by male
guards, do not violate the privacy rights of male prisoners. 174 In a
post-feminist voice, Senior Circuit Judge Bright's dissent argues that
treating men and women as equals does not require courts to ignore
the differences that exist between them. He accused the majority of
stripping prisoners of their privacy rights in order to equalize the
employment opportunities for male and female guards.
75
F. Concern for Symmetry in the Treatment of Searches Conducted
by Male and Female Guards Distract some Judges from
Interrogating Hierarchies of Masculinity, which
Threaten the Safety of many Male Prisoners.
One aspect of the development of the cross-gender search doc-
trine that is particularly disturbing is the insistence by some judges
that rules regulating cross-gender searches in men's prisons must be
identical to rules regulating searches in women's prisons. By requiring
identical rules, these judges overlook critical differences in the sexual-
ization of power in men and women's prisons.
171 See Canell, 840 F. Supp. at 784.
172 See id.
173 917 F.2d 1093, 1103 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright, J., dissenting).
174 See id. at 1100 (Bright, J., dissenting).
175 See id. at 1102-03 (Bright, J., dissenting).
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Some judges believe that men and women's prisons must be sym-
metrical for the rules of cross-gender searches to be constitutional.
For example, the Nebraska correctional system accommodates the pri-
vacy rights of female prisoners by severely restricting the employment
of male guards in contact positions at the Nebraska Center for
Women. 76 In his dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Bright implies in Timm
that the asymmetry created by denying comparable privacy accommo-
dations for male prisoners in a system, which accommodates the pri-
vacy of female prisoners by eliminating cross-gender contact between
prisoners and guards, is inequitable and treats male prisoners
unfairly.
177
The problem inherent in the search for symmetry is that it ignores
the unique problems of sex and power in men and women's prisons,
which are similar to those arising in the context of equal protection for
whites and blacks. Sexual vulnerability of male and female prisoners
is not identical and there are genuine differences in the sexualization
of power in men and women's prisons. For example, far more guard-
on-prisoner sexual violence is thought to occur between male guards
and prisoners in women's prisons than in men's prisons. On the other
hand, far more prisoner-on-prisoner sexual violence is believed to
occur in men's prisons. Judicial insistence upon formal symmetry fails
to recognize that men and women experience unwanted intimate
physical contact and nudity before members of the opposite sex differ-
ently. Indeed one commentator noted that using the same standard
for searches of male and female prisoners affords female prisoners a
substantial advantage over their male counterparts.
1 78
Courts and commentators also err when they characterize the
experiences of male and female prisoners as entirely distinct. For
example, Lisa Krim argues that courts should adopt an asymmetrical,
gender-specific, "reasonable woman" Eighth Amendment standard
for judging the propriety of cross-gender, clothed body searches. 79
Krim acknowledges the heightened danger that arises from the inter-
action of power and sexuality in social relations between guards and
176 See id. at 1097-98 n.5 (Bright J., dissenting).
177 See id. at 1103-04 (Bright, J., dissenting).
178 See Karoline E. Jackson, The Legitimacy of Cross-Gender Searches and Surveillance in
Prison: Defining an Appropriate and Uniform Review, 73 IND. L.J. 959, 971-74 (1998).
179 See Lisa Krim, A Reasonable Woman's Version of Cruel And Unusual Punishment:
Cross-Gender, Clothed-Body Searches Of Women Prisoners, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 85, 89, 116-18 (1995).
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prisoners, but sets out to prove by distinguishing them from male pris-
oners that women need special protection from sexual misconduct by
male guards. She focuses on the particular sexualized violence to
which female prisoners are vulnerable, and refutes opposing positions
by asserting that "the experiences of male inmates with female guards
do not demonstrate that [sexual abuse by female guards] is a real dan-
ger."' 8  This forecloses the possibility of limiting cross-gender
searches on the basis of intra-gender sexual abuse. Krim focuses on
the histories of sexual abuse common to incarcerated women, but
ignores the fact that many incarcerated men also have histories of sex-
ual abuse, often at the hands of other men (fathers, uncles, etc.) and
are statistically more likely to be sexually preyed upon in prison by
fellow prisoners than incarcerated women are by male guards.
The harsh facts of life in America's predacious, overcrowded pris-
ons provide a much needed reality check on judicial discussions of
gender-and the propriety of searches across gender lines in prison.
They influence how searches are conducted by guards and perceived
by prisoners. Yet, with few exceptions, federal courts largely ignore
the sexually charged tenor of the complaints, emphasizing instead the
penological objectives of maintaining security and avoiding discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender. Sexual frustration and intimidation per-
vade the allegations of prisoners challenging cross-gender surveillance
policies. The constitutional analysis of cross-gender searches must
consider the context of sexualized power and violence out of which
these challenges emerge. It must not consist merely of formalistic
rationalizations for deferring to the judgments of prison officials.
Searches of male prisoners by female guards take place within a
violent, rigidly hierarchical subculture in which sexual status defines
social status, and associations with passivity or femininity (inter-
changeable in the sexist context of prison) are severely penalized.
Searches of female prisoners by male guards occur in an environment
in which male prison staff use their authority to procure sex from pris-
oners in exchange for privileges and favors that relieve some of the
hardships of incarceration. If courts take the constitutional guaran-
tees of individual rights seriously, they must go beyond ritualistic
incantations of doctrine and seriously examine how power is sexual-
ized in prison to arrive at a just resolution of the conflict between
prisoner privacy and the employment rights of guards.
180 Id. at 108.
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IV. JOHNSON V. PhELAN
On its face, Johnson v. Phelan18' appears to be yet another in a
line of cases that interpret the law of cross-gender searches while
overlooking inconsistencies in the doctrine. Indeed, the opinion
reflects the "cut and paste" recitation of doctrine from Bell,'182 Hud-
son 83 and Turner 84 and other precedents that are standard among
these cases. However, Chief Judge Richard Posner's dissent stands
out as the first post-Hudson opinion to broadly condemn the failure of
courts to take into account the realities of prison life when examining
the propriety of cross-gender searches. Posner consciously probed the
moral and legal issues raised by cross-gender searches, drawing atten-
tion to the essentialization of prisoners in the context of the constitu-
tional doctrine. 85
The majority and dissenting opinions in Phelan took opposing
positions on the permissibility of assigning female guards to contact
positions in men's prisons where they are able to observe prisoners
naked in showers and toileting areas. In contrast to the majority's
meticulous, albeit soul-less explication of conflicting privacy and
employment rights,186 the dissenting opinion interprets the Constitu-
tion in light of the gendered realities of prison life."8 Posner's dissent
emphasizes the extent to which the legal analysis of privacy and gen-
der has become estranged from the realities of prison life. Although a
fuller discussion of the realities of prison life (including the sexual pre-
dation that is an aspect of the broader sexualization of power) is dis-
placed by Posner's harangue of "radical feminists,"' 8 8 his dissenting
opinion nevertheless broke new doctrinal ground.
Part Four of this article focuses on Judge Posner's critical insight
into the shortsightedness of traditional privacy-based analysis of cross-
gender searches. After briefly describing the disposition of Johnson v.
Phelan by the district court, Part Four describes and contrasts the rea-
soning of the majority and dissenting opinions, emphasizing the
181 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995).
182 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
183 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
184 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
185 See Phelan, 69 F.3d at 151 (Posner, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
186 See id. at 144.
187 See id. at 151,
188 Id. at 153-54.
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potential in Judge Posner's earnest argument for a new, more coher-
ent constitutional analysis of cross-gender searches in prisons.
A. The District Court Quickly Disposed of Johnson's Privacy
Claim.
During his confinement in Chicago's enormous Cook County Jail,
Albert Johnson filed a lawsuit against Cook County, Illinois officials
claiming that his constitutional right to privacy had been violated.
Johnson alleged that female guards had observed him naked in the
showers of the jail and through a faulty partition using the toilet in the
detainee's bathroom of the Cook County Criminal Courthouse on
occasions when he had to appear in court.'89 Each of the five defend-
ants moved to dismiss Johnson's complaint. 19° The district court con-
sidered each of the alleged privacy violations and dismissed the claims
against all five defendants in their individual and official capacities in
a brief, unreported opinion. 191
Johnson's privacy-based challenge to the jail's cross-gender moni-
toring policy was disposed of by the district court in four short
paragraphs."9 Judge Alesia balanced the limited privacy rights of
prisoners against two other competing interests: (1) the vitally impor-
tant interest of jail officials in maintaining internal security-particu-
larly in showers where violent attacks on prisoners are more likely to
occur; and (2) the rights of women to equal opportunity in correc-
tional employment.'93 In doing so, Judge Alesia concluded that the
employment rights of the guards and the security interest of the jail
outweighed Johnson's right of privacy. 194
In rejecting Johnson's privacy claim, Judge Alesia relied on the
diminished scope of prisoner privacy and the incidental and inadver-




192 See id. The incidental observation by female guards of male inmates through a faulty
partition raises issues distinct from cross-gender visual surveillance in living areas of correctional
facilities. First, female guards were able to observe male detainees using the toilet due to a
broken fixture-an exceptional circumstance-rather than an official policy of cross-gender
monitoring. Secondly, the inadvertent observation took place in a courthouse, rather than the
Cook County Jail, therefore causation is more difficult to establish.
193 See id. at *34.
194 See id. at *4.
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tent nature of the observation.1 95 Whereas the judge predictably
intoned language from Bell v. Wolfish narrowly restricting the scope
of prisoner privacy, 196 he cited Hudson1 97 (as Chief Judge Posner did
at the appellate level)198 for the proposition that prisoners nonetheless
retain some degree of privacy to their bodies199 - rather than for the
frequently cited maxim that privacy is fundamentally incompatible
with incarceration. Ultimately, Judge Alesia concluded that Johnson
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and dis-
missed the case with prejudice.2°
Johnson appealed the district court's holding on the single count
relating to visual surveillance in the showers of the Cook County Jail.
Chief Judge Richard Posner and Circuit Judges Frank Easterbrook
and Wilbur Pell heard the appeal. Historically allied both as leaders
within the school of law and economics and as co-authors of a popular
antitrust casebook, Posner and Easterbrook diverged radically on this
issue.
B. Easterbrook's Majority Opinion Drastically Departs from the
Seventh Circuit's Earlier Decision in Canedy v. Boardman.
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, took the extreme
view that Hudson eliminated the application of the Fourth Amend-
ment to prisoners. His view was extreme in two respects. First, in
taking the position that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of
the Eighth Amendment is the only constitutional protection prisoners
enjoy against involuntary exposure to guards of the opposite sex, Eas-
terbrook departs from even the most conservative interpretations of
195 "Johnson does not claim that female correctional officers are assigned to observe
inmates while showering. Any observation by female guards appears to be incidental and inad-
vertent." Phelan, 1993 WL 388827at *4 (unreported decision). "Since Jail officials have a legiti-
mate interest in maintaining some level of observation of inmates while in the showers, and since
the occasional viewing of male inmates by female correctional officers appears to be at most
infrequent and incidental to their legitimate presence in the institution, the court finds that John-
son has failed to state a claim that his privacy rights were violated in the instance." Id.
196 See id. at *2. "Loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confine-
ment." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979).
197 468 U.S. 517, 528 (1983).
198 See Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 152-54 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring &
dissenting).
199 See Phelan, 1993 WL 388827, at *2.
200 See id. at *4.
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Hudson.2°t Second, Easterbrook's narrow interpretation of prisoner
privacy in the context of visual surveillance contrasts sharply with the
Seventh Circuit's posture in Canedy v. Boardman. °2 Canedy was the
first cross-gender search case heard by the Seventh Circuit after the
Supreme Court decided Hudson.
Easterbrook's opinion overturns the holding in Canedy that fre-
quent and deliberate visual monitoring of nude inmates by guards of
the opposite sex violates prisoner privacy.0 3 In Canedy, a male
inmate in Wisconsin's Columbia Correctional Institution complained
of being regularly observed in various states of undress while shower-
ing, tioleting, dressing and sleeping. He also complained of being
humiliated and embarrassed by strip searches conducted by female
guards. Canedy unequivocally held that frequent and deliberate vis-
ual monitoring of inmates in their living quarters by opposite sex
guards was unconstitutional. 24 The Seventh Circuit's decision in Phe-
lan, only nine months later, departed dramatically from this holding.
The majority opinion in Canedy coheres around the principal that
the constitutionality of cross-gender searches must be evaluated con-
textually, rather than categorically. Writing for the majority, Judge
Cudahy concluded that accommodating the conflicting rights of male
prisoners and female guards is the remedy appropriate to the facts in
Canedy and to cross-gender search cases generally.
For the overwhelming majority of the cases have declined to fashion
such categorical rules, but rather have required that reasonable
201 Easterbrook's interpretation of Hudson was unprecedented. Other cases read Hudson
as eliminating privacy in a prisoner's cell, but none had gone so far as to find that Hudson
eliminated privacy in prisoners' bodies, within or without their cells. Although Hudson left the
door open, no court had gone so far as to extend to prisoners' bodies Hudson's retrenchment of
privacy in prisoners' cells. See generally Phelan, 69 F.3d 144; Canedy, 16 F.3d 183.
202 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994).
203 Indeed, Easterbrook vociferously defends frequent and deliberate cross-sex visual
observation even though the district court characterized the surveillance at issue as incidental.
204 In Canedy, the Seventh Circuit cited Hudson for the proposition that "some diminution
of privacy is of course to be expected in prison," but quickly went on to add that nevertheless
"though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environ-
ment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protection when he is imprisoned for a
crime." Canedy, 16 F.3d. at 186-87. In contrast to its later treatment of the issue in Phelan, the
Seventh Circuit in Canedy distinguishes cases that categorically exempt prisoners from protec-
tion against visual observation while nude.
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accommodations be made, and that the respective interests be
balanced.205
Consistent with its contextual analysis, the Canedy court drew a clear
distinction between searches it considered less objectionable (e.g.,
inadvertent or occasional sightings of nude prisoners) from those it
considered more objectionable, namely regular, deliberate monitoring
of shower, toilet and dressing areas. Judge Cudahy cited nearly
twenty federal cases and a law review article to support his reasoning.
In acknowledging this distinction, Cudahy challenges the notion that
the physicality of the search determines the degree to which it
impinges upon constitutional privacy. Yet this is the aspect of the
Canedy decision that most disturbs Judge Easterbrook.
Judge Easterbrook wholly rejects the Foucauldian notion that the
disembodied gaze can be more intrusive, more threatening, more
legally troubling than tactile "hands on" body searches. In short
order, Judge Easterbrook relegates the contextual analysis of cross-
gender searches in Canedy to dictum.
Anonymous visual inspections from afar are considerably less intru-
sive and carry less potential for "the unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain." To the extent incautious language in Canedy implies
that deliberate visual inspections are indistinguishable from physical
palpitations, its discussion is dictum. Further reflection leads us to
conclude that it should not be converted to a holding.
207
205 Canedy, 16 F.3d at 188.
206 Federal courts have trouble reconciling equal opportunities for women and the privacy
right of male prisoners.
[A] state's interest in providing equal employment opportunity for female guards needs
to be weighed against the privacy rights of prisoners. The cases therefore hold that sex is
not a bona fide occupational qualification preventing women from working in all-male
prisons, and that pat-down searches and occasional or inadvertent sighting by female
prison employees of inmates in their cells or open showers do not violate the inmates' right
to privacy. But that right is violated where this observation is more intrusive (like a strip
search, in the absence of an emergency) or a regular occurrence.
Canedy, 16 F.3d at 187 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
207 Phelan, 69 F.3d at 148.
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C. Easterbrook's Majority Opinion Concludes that Unfettered
Visual Surveillance of Male Prisoners while Showering and
Toileting is a Necessary and Constitutionally
Acceptable Security Measure.
Easterbrook ultimately affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Johnson's claim that his privacy was violated when female guards
observed him naked in the showers of the Cook County Jail. He rea-
soned by an almost syllogistic process of eliminating individual consti-
tutional theories that would limit cross-gender surveillance by guards
in prisoners' living areas. First, he dispensed with the Fourth Amend-
ment as an impediment to visual monitoring by: (1) invoking Bell for
its admonition that judges refrain from substituting their judgement
for that of prison officials; (2) citing Hudson for the proposition that
the Fourth Amendment no longer applies to prisoners; and (3) recon-
structing persuasive invocations of privacy in Canedy as weak Eighth
Amendment claims in disguise. "We therefore think it best to under-
stand the references to "privacy" in Canedy and similar cases as invo-
cations of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishments. 2 °8 Easterbrook urged that together, Bell and Hudson
not only permit frequent and deliberate monitoring of naked prison-
ers, but also actually mandate it.2°9 Easterbrook was emphatic -
even delirious, as one commentator suggested 210 - that in the wake of
the Bell and Wolfish decisions, unfettered surveillance is paramount
to effective security. "[C]onstant vigilance without regard to the state
of the prisoner's dress is essential. Vigilance over showers, vigilance
over cells - vigilance everywhere, which means that guards gaze
upon naked inmates.
21 1
Next, Easterbrook eliminated the Fifth Amendment substantive
due process as an obstacle to monitoring. He applied the doctrine of
Turner v. Safely, which set a unified standard for all impingements
upon prisoners' constitutional rights.2 12 Under Turner, the test of a
regulation's constitutional validity is whether the regulation is reason-
ably related to a legitimate penological objective.213 Turner triggers a
discussion of the penological interests advanced by visual monitoring
208 Id. at 147.
209 See id. at 146.
210 See HYDE, supra note 80, at 163.
211 Phelan, 69 F.3d at 146.
212 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
213 See id. at 89-90.
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of naked male prisoners by female guards. Easterbrook focused on
two: (1) the obligation of prison officials' under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to employ women on an equal basis as men, and
(2) deference to the decisions of prison administrators. Easterbrook
concluded that the court was bound to Cook County's decision to
deploy female guards in areas where male prisoners can be seen nude,
frequently and deliberately.
Finally, Easterbrook eliminated the Eighth Amendment as a
means of challenging the constitutionality of cross-gender monitoring
in the showers. This is the denouement of Easterbrook's rights
retrenching narrative. Since the Eighth Amendment's proscription of
Cruel and Unusual Punishment is violated only when prisoners are
intentionally subjected to "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"
Easterbrook needed to find only that such monitoring has some alter-
native penological purpose. Such as (1) the efficient deployment of
security staff; and (2) the prevention of impermissible sex
discrimination:
Monitoring is vital, but how about the cross-sex part? For this there
are two justifications. First, it makes good use of the staff ... Second,
cross-sex monitoring reduces the need for prisons to make sex a crite-
rion of employment, and therefore reduces the potential for conflict
with Title VII and the equal protection clause.214
The "infliction of pain" standard for Eighth Amendment viola-
tions is extremely high because it focuses largely on the prisoner's sub-
jective experience of pain. In Jordan v. Gardner, a case challenging
cross-gender clothed body searches of female prisoners in a Washing-
ton state women's correctional facility, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that this high Eighth Amendment threshold was met when female
prisoners subjectively experienced pain in reaction to "hands on,"
cross-gender clothed body searches.215 Easterbrook foreclosed the
argument that cross-sex surveillance is ipso facto cruel and unusual in
two parts. First, he articulated two alternative justifications for cross-
gender visual observation. Second, he distinguished the basis of John-
son's complaint as an objection not to the search itself, but to
214 Id. at 147.
215 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993).
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deploying opposite-sex staff to conduct it. Easterbrook summarizes
his analysis as follows:
Where does this leave us? The Fourth Amendment does not protect
privacy interests within prisons. Moving to other amendments does
not change the outcome. Cross-sex monitoring is not a senseless
imposition. As a reconciliation of conflicting entitlements and desires,
it satisfies the Turner standard. It cannot be called "inhumane" and
therefore does not fall below the floor set by the objective component
of the Eighth Amendment. And Johnson does not contend that his
captors adopted their monitoring patterns because of, rather than in
spite of, the embarrassment it causes some prisoners. He does not
submit that the warden ignored his sensibilities; he argues only that
they received too little weight in the felicific calculus. Like the district
court, therefore, we conclude that the complaint fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted.216
Easterbrook's analysis of the opposite sex surveillance in the
Cook County Jail is savvier than most, yet his opinion still echoes
inconsistencies that characterize the larger body of cross-gender
search doctrine. For instance, he addressed only one aspect of cross-
gender monitoring - women guarding men - overlooking legal
precedents and constitutional analysis in cases where cross-gender
monitoring involved men guarding women. In doing so, Easterbrook
neatly avoided the problem of formal symmetry.2 17 Further, Easter-
brook acknowledged that the biological sex of guards and prisoners is
only one of several criteria, including sexual orientation, that bear
upon the propriety of security assignments. Nevertheless, he dis-
missed the lack of fit as inconsequential. 218 Through the lens of the
Eighth Amendment, only treatment of prisoners that wantonly and
unnecessarily inflicts pain registers on Easterbrook's radar screen.
Reading Hudson more narrowly and placing more emphasis on the
decision than the court did in Canedy, Easterbrook easily dispensed
with prisoners' objections to cross-sex monitoring as overly burden-
216 Id. at 150-51.
217 "The interest of women in equal treatment is a solid reason with more secure footing in
American law than prisoners' modesty." Phelan, 69 F.3d at 148.
218 There are too many permutations to place guards and prisoners into multiple classes by
sex, sexual orientation, and perhaps other criteria, allowing each group to be observed only by
the corresponding groups that occasion the least unhappiness. See id. at 147.
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some personal preferences, which prison officials are entitled to
ignore.
D. Posner's Dissenting Opinion Analyzes the Conflict between
Prisoners' Privacy and Women's Employment as Guards
Contextually, Rather Than Categorically.
Judge Easterbrook favored the application of categorical rules to
the privacy claims of prisoners. In stark contrast, Chief Judge Posner's
dissenting opinion emphasized the importance of context in the con-
stitutional analysis of those claims. Indeed Posner likened the Eighth
Amendment to a Rorschach test, reflecting judicial values shaped
largely by personal values and morality.2 t9 The strength of Posner's
dissent is the realism he lends to the constitutional analysis of cross-
gender search cases, by: (1) rejecting one-dimensional, essentializing
characterizations of prisoners; (2) drawing attention to inconsistency
and confusion within the doctrine of cross-gender searches; and (3)
acknowledging the force inherent in subjecting a nude subject to the
unobstructed gaze of a stranger of the opposite sex. Posner takes us
beyond the abstract balancing of privacy and employment rights that
fails to do justice to the complex relationship between privacy, sex,
sexuality and violence.
1. Posner Rejected the One-dimensional, Essentializing
Characterizations of Prisoners.
Posner's dissenting opinion proceeds from the basic notion that
prisoners are individuals deserving of fundamental constitutional pro-
tection, rather than an abstract category of legal subjects to which the
Bill of Rights only remotely applies. Posner focused on the realities of
prison life and the moral dubiety of cross-gender surveillance. In
doing so, he articulated the human dimension of cross-gender
surveillance.
One way is to look upon [prisoners] as members of a different species,
indeed as a type of vermin, devoid of human dignity and entitled to no
respect; and then no issue concerning the degrading or brutalizing
219 "The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, like so much in the Bill of Rights, is a Rorschach test. What the judge sees
in it is the reflection of his or her own values, values shaped by personal experience and temper-
ament as well as by historical reflection, public opinion, and other sources or moral judgment."
Id. at 151.
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treatment of prisoners would arise. In particular there would be no
inhibitions about using prisoners as the subject of experiments, includ-
ing social experiments such as the experiment of seeing whether the
sexes can be made interchangeable. The parading of naked male
inmates in front of female guards, or of naked female inmates in front
of male guards, would be no more problematic than "cross-sex surveil-
lance" in a kennel. I do not [ ] consider the 1.5 million inmates of
American prisons and jails in that light.
221
In one of the most generous characterizations of prisoners since
the Prisoners Rights Era, Posner reminds us that prisoners are not a
monolithic group and warns us of the danger of constructing prisoners
as a class of outsiders undeserving of humane consideration.
A substantial number of these prison and jail inmates, including the
plaintiff in this case, have not been convicted of a crime. They are
merely charged with a crime, and awaiting trial. Some of them may
actually be innocent. Of the guilty, many are guilty of sumptuary
offenses, or of other victimless crimes uncannily similar to lawful
activity (gambling offenses are an example), or of esoteric financial
and regulatory offenses (such as violation of the migratory game laws)
some of which do not even require a guilty intent . ... 221
In marked contrast to Easterbrook's reasoning that the chal-
lenged cross-gender surveillance is permissible because no constitu-
tional standard specifically forbids it, Posner immediately asserts the
importance of the interest at stake, then argues for its protection.
[W]e should have a realistic conception of the composition of the
prison and jail population before deciding that they are a scum enti-
tled to nothing better than what a vengeful populace and a resource-
starved penal system choose to give them. We must not exaggerate
the distance between "us," the lawful ones, the respectable ones, and
the prison and jail population; for such exaggeration will make it too
easy for us to deny that population the rudiments of humane
consideration.
222
220 Id. at 151 (Posner, J. concurring & dissenting).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 152.
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Thus, Posner vehemently dissents from the majority's conclusion
that allowing female guards to conduct visual surveillance on male
prisoners in their living quarters does not offend the constitution.223
2. Posner Criticized the Confused Doctrinal Framework in which
the Propriety of Cross-Gender Searches is Analyzed.
Posner criticized courts for conflating several different notions of
privacy in determining the constitutionality of various prisoner search
policies. Posner observed that the term "privacy" in its everyday use
has quite a different meaning than the formal legal concept of privacy.
He then enumerated some of the varied meanings of privacy.224 These
meanings included reproductive autonomy; tort-based privacy, which
protects an individual from public disclosure of private facts; confi-
dentiality in certain documents and conversations; and Fourth
Amendment based privacy, which protects individuals from unreason-
able government searches and seizures. Indeed, a vast array of prison-
ers' claims have been litigated under the rubric of privacy and courts
have accorded vastly different levels of protection to these various
claims.2 s Posner rightly points out that the sources of law giving rise
to these claims-the Fourth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment,
substantive due process, the unenumerated penumbra of the Bill of
Rights - as well as the legal standards by which they are judged, have
223 "Animals have no right to wear clothing. Why prisoners, if they are no better than
animals? There is no answer, if the premise is accepted. But it should be rejected, and if it is
rejected, and the duty of a society that would like to think of itself as civilized to treat its prison-
ers humanely therefore acknowledged, then I think that the interest of a prisoner in being free
from unnecessary cross-sex surveillance has priority over the unisex bathroom movement and
requires us to reverse the judgment of the district court throwing out this lawsuit." Phelan, 69
F.3d at 152.
224 Specifically, Posner contends "[t]he problem is that the term 'right of privacy' bears
meanings in law that are remote from its primary ordinary language meaning .... Id. at 152.
225 Privacy in the sense of disclosure of "private" facts about a prisoner (e.g. HIV status) is
very different than the type of confidentiality privacy potentially invaded when a prisoner's mail
is read. The former is more related to tort-based privacy, while the latter invasion of privacy
implicates the First Amendment. Both these types of privacy claims differ from the privacy that
might be violated by involuntary exposure of a prisoner's naked body to a guard of the opposite
sex,. . . a claim generally litigated under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. Finally, the type
of privacy affect when a pregnant prisoner is denied an abortion - reproductive privacy - is yet
another form of privacy implicated by incarceration. See Bryand v. Mafucci, 923 F.2d 979 (2d
Cir. 1991). See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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been confused and collapsed in constitutional jurisprudence. 226 Pos-
ner's discomfort with the evolution of the privacy doctrine is right on
target, in spite of his ultimate argument that such confusion would be
neatly eliminated by adoption of a single Eighth Amendment stan-
dard by which all prisoner surveillance cases would be measured.227
He asserts that in the rush to reduce the scope of constitutional pro-
tections enjoyed by prisoners, the fine line doctrinal distinctions are
disappearing.
Posner draws attention to the lack of clear guidelines for a legally
acceptable balance between prohibited sex discrimination against
guards and constitutionally protected privacy for prisoners.228 Indeed,
the cases display a tremendous lack of uniformity in the weight federal
courts accord the two major justifications for limiting prisoner pri-
vacy-internal security and equal employment-in balancing the
interests of the prison and the prisoner. Following Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, some courts weighed equal employment against the disruption
affording such opportunities to women would cause to prison security.
However, the nature of the balancing changed dramatically after Bell
and Hudson. Given the emphasis on maintaining internal security in
Bell, and the drastic reduction of privacy in Hudson, equal employ-
ment policies condoning same sex searches were assumed to be con-
sistent with the security interests of prisons. After Turner, the balance
shifted again. Courts increasingly viewed equal employment as a
legitimate penological objective, a factor that need only have a
rational connection to a prison policy to override the prisoner's pri-
229vacy claim.
226 "The problem is that the term 'right of privacy' bears meanings in law that are remote
from its primary ordinary language meaning, which happens to be the meaning that a suit of this
sort invokes." Phelan, 69 F.3d at 152.
227 "1 consider [analyzing cross-gender surveillance on the basis of privacy doctrine] too
tortuous and uncertain a route to follow in the quest for constitutional limitations on the inflic-
tion of humiliation on prison inmates. The Eighth Amendment forbids the federal government
to inflict cruel and unusual punishments .... Id.
228 "I have no patience with the suggestion that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
forbids a prison or jail to impede, however slightly, the career opportunities of female guards by
shielding naked male prisoners from their eyes... [T]itle VII cannot override the Constitution."
Id. at 153.
229 See Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d
328, 331 (9th Cir. 1988); Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1225 (6th Cir. 1987) ("To the extent that
it is an operational or administrative necessity, nondiscrimination is also, by definition, a legiti-
mate penological objective.").
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Another aspect of confusion within the doctrine of cross-gender
searches relates to an unspoken, nevertheless pervasive assumption
that only visual surveillance by a member of the opposite sex is prob-
lematic. There are many instances of sexual intimidation through gaz-
ing, which cannot be addressed within a conventional heterosexual
paradigm of gender. The fact that same sex surveillance of the nude
bodies of prisoners is implicitly unproblematic in these cases is troub-
ling. It is evidence of a heterosexual presumption that is hardly
appropriate in the transgendered context of prison.23 ° Furthermore, it
exempts from judicial scrutiny the same type of sexually intimidating
gazing that, if practiced across gender or in the (non-carceral) work-
place, would be problematic. Male prisoners observed naked by gay
male guards have no cognizable Fourth Amendment claim; likewise
for female prisoners viewed naked by lesbian guards. And what of
transgendered prisoners under the eye of guards of either sex?
231
Judge Posner's dissenting opinion in Phelan serves to remind us that
courts have neglected to regulate visual surveillance by guards of pris-
230 In a candid footnote, the majority opinion in Canedy v. Boardman points out the heter-
osexual presumption contained in the appellate briefs in that case, and more generally, in the
many of the cross-gender search cases. "[Miany of the cases discussed below involving cross-
gender observations and strip searches, as well as Canedy's brief on appeal here, make a com-
mon assumption. In their declaration that 'the nudity taboo, and hence the invasion of privacy
involved when it is forcibly broken, is much greater between the sexes than among members of
the same sex,' these authorities and submissions appear to assume that all the relevant actors are
heterosexual." Canedy, 16 F.2d at 185 n.1 (citation omitted).
231 The failure of federal courts to factor sex, sexual orientation and sexual domination into
the analysis of cross-gender searches is consistent with the conflation of sex, gender and sexual
orientation described by queer theorist Frank Valdes. See Frank Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes
and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender" and "Sexual Orientation" in
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995). Valdes deconstructs sex and gender
in the context of American anti-discrimination law. He contends that Western culture and
American Law conflate, among others, sex and sexual orientation. In doing so, he posits the
legal and normative construction of sex, gender and sexual orientation in relation to each other
in ways that both bias anti-discrimination laws and fail to reflect the broad spectrum of human
experience. Professor Valdes similarly claims that legal doctrine is out of touch with the reality
of many people's lives.
The doctrine of cross-gender searches similarly conflates gender and sexual orientation. This
is perhaps the most troubling when courts restrict surveillance of naked prisoners to guards of
the same sex because they reason that it is consistent with sexual modesty regarding exposure to
non-intimates of the opposite sex. This logic contains an inherent heterosexist bias that prison-
ers searched by guards of the same sex do not experience sexual modesty. It assumes that a
person's gender determines their sexual orientation. The Seventh Circuit pointed this out in
Canedy v. Boardman.
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oners on a more qualitative, more substantively meaningful, and less
equivocal basis than gender.
Judge Easterbrook both acknowledged and accepted this limita-
tion, rationalizing that "there are too many permutations to place
guards and prisoners into multiple classes by sex, sexual orientation,
and perhaps other criteria, allowing each group to be observed only
by the corresponding groups that occasion the least unhappiness.
2 3 2
Moreover, the overtly sexual gazing of inmate-on-inmate occasions no
violation of privacy. This suggests that the limitations on gazing serve
to reduce the potential liability of prisons for Title VII violations,
rather than protect prisoner privacy.
Posner's realism interrogates Easterbrook's assertion that defer-
ence to prison officials resolves the conflict between prisoners' privacy
rights and the employment rights of guards. Easterbrook's insistence
on deference neatly avoids the problem of formal symmetry that has
troubled other courts. As I discussed earlier, federal judges have
232 Phelan, 69 F.3d at 147. The work of art historians and critical film theorists suggest an
alternative basis for the nature of surveillance, a nudity taboo that informs and expands the
limited work of feminist legal theorists on gender, privacy and surveillance in prisons. Theorists
of art history have analyzed the power inherent in gazing. In Rethinking Art History: Medita-
tions on a Coy Science, Donald Preziosi theorizes the relationship between the heterotopic archi-
tecture of the museum and the disciplinary transmission of knowledge. Preziosi posits that
technological apparatuses such as projected voices and the third person voice of historical narra-
tive order the museum goer's understanding of what she sees. See DAVID PREZIOSI, RETHINK-
ING ART HISTORY: MEDITATIONS ON A COY SCIENCE 54-79 (1989).
Most useful to feminist scholars of incarceration is that Preziosi links the disciplinary trans-
mission of knowledge within museums to that of prisons. Whereas Preziosi focuses upon the
power of the anonymous gaze in the Eighteenth Century carceral setting of Bentham's Panop-
ticon, critical feminist film theorists focus on the gendered nature of spectatorship and the inher-
ent difference in power and authority reflected in the gaze when the woman is its initiator rather
than it's object. See THE FEMALE GAZE: WOMEN AS VIEWERS OF POPULAR CULTURE (Lorraine
Gamman & Marsha Marshment, eds., 1989). Their work stems from Laura Mulvey's thesis in
"Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" that visual pleasure in mainstream Hollywood cinema
derives and reproduces a structure of male gazing and female objectification which replicates the
structure of unequal power relations between men and women. They are suspicious, however, of
privileging gender as the category which structures perspective and suggest that other categories
(such as class, race or sexual orientation) may equally organize power relations through the
process of visual objectification.
Borrowing from the work of media theorists contributes to our understanding of the
gendered power relationship that is reproduced in the act of gazing. That relationship is more
complex, and less reciprocal than a moral taboo. To the extent that men are more accustomed to
objectifying women through the act of looking than vice-versa, men are disempowered by cross-
gender surveillance, particularly when partially or entirely undressed. More accustomed to
objectification by men, women are similarly disempowered by cross-sex surveillance, but no
more so than before they were incarcerated.
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grappled with the propriety of cross-gender searches in correctional
systems that permit female guards to search male prisoners, while
prohibiting the converse. Easterbrook frames the issue as one of def-
erence to prison administrators. His logic implies that courts are
bound to defer to the judgements of prison administrators regarding
how best to deploy female and male guards to achieve institutional
objectives. However, as Posner points out, the reality is that women
(not men) are seeking opportunities within the field of corrections.
Prison officials are rarely under pressure to expand employment
opportunities for male guards. Therefore, it is most often the case
that deference will favor the deployment of female guards in contact
positions where they are likely to observe male prisoners in states of
undress, and work against the interests of male prisoners in bodily
privacy.
3. Posner Erroneously Acknowledges the Force Inherent in
Subjecting a Nude Subject to the Unobstructed Gaze of a
Stranger of the Opposite Sex and its Moral
Objectionability.
Posner posits the existence of a taboo against being seen nude by
a stranger of the opposite sex.
The nudity taboo retains great strength in the United States. It should
not be confused with prudery. It is a taboo against being seen in the
nude by strangers, not by one's intimates ... The taboo is particularly
strong when the stranger belongs to the opposite sex.
2 3 3
In identifying a religion-based historically derived norm against cross-
sex gazing, Posner appeals to a higher moral authority than the correc-
tional administrator to whom many courts give deference to decide
whether or not to have guards monitor nude prisoners of the opposite
sex. He is also suggesting that the intangible, impalpable gaze itself-
when directed at a nude prisoner of the opposite sex-contains a sex-
ual power that the categorical analyses of cross-sex searches
overlooks.
Posner's dissenting opinion is an insightful critique of the doctrine
of cross-gender searches and the failure of federal courts to analyze
the constitutional validity of these searches with an eye toward the
233 Phelan, 69 F.3d at 152.
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realities of life inside America's correctional warehouses. Neverthe-
less, Posner's own biases cloud his analysis. The weaknesses in Pos-
ner's argument are primarily threefold: (1) the relativism in what
Posner characterizes as a universal taboo against being seen naked by
non-inmates; (2) Posner's scapegoating of "radical feminists;" and (3)
his essentialization of prisons as male. I will address each of these
criticisms in turn.
First, Posner posits that a culturally normative nudity taboo over-
rides any construction of positive law that would permit women to
gaze upon the bodies of naked men who are not intimates and vice-
versa.234 He asserts that the nudity taboo is strongest between mem-
bers of the opposite sex and distinct from prudery. The strength of
Posner's natural law proscription is specious. As Judge Easterbrook
points out, accepted practices such as medical examination by a physi-
cian or nurse of the opposite sex, co-ed hot tubs and saunas and the
constitutionally protected practice of nude dancing belie the strength
of such a norm in the United States. The growing popularity of strip-
o-grams as entertainment at office, birthday and stag parties similarly
casts doubt upon the existence of such a norm. Its uniformity is
doubtful as well. The aversion to nudity before strangers of the oppo-
site sex (by Posner's own admission) tends to be experienced more by
the religiously devout than others in this country's "morally diverse
populace. "235
Nevertheless, invoking the taboo enables Judge Posner to posi-
tion basic human values (such as the humane treatment of prisoners)
in direct opposition to the notions of workplace equality for women
embraced by liberal feminists, whom he criticizes for deconstructing
gender as an instrument of patriarchy. To the extent that a moral
taboo constructs boundaries between the sexes, the boundaries are
"real" and impervious to the agenda of (those Posner refers to as)
"radical feminists" whom Posner accuses of de-sexing prisoners on the
road to employment equity for women.
Second, Posner makes a sweeping generalization about gender in
penal institutions to support of the right of male prisoners to be
clothed in the presence of female guards, and the ability of prison offi-
cials to exclude women from whole areas of men's prisons. He stated:
234 See id.
235 Id. at 152.
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The reality is that crime is gendered, and the gender is male ... The
vast majority of criminals are males. The vast majority of their victims
are males. The vast majority of police and correctional officers are
males. These are inescapable realities in the design of penal institu-
tions and the validation of penal practices.236
With this assertion, Posner imputes an immutable gender-bound trait
to prisons. A critique of this approach is well developed within femi-
nist jurisprudence, and among feminist scholars of penology. The
essentialization of prisons as male ignores a long history of women's
incarceration that has often been harsher than the criminal punish-
ment of men.237 Furthermore, it ignores the fact that growth in the
female prison population is currently outpacing that of men.
Third, Posner blames the dehumanization of male prisoners on
the feminist movement because of its efforts to provide equal employ-
ment opportunities within corrections for women, rather than the cor-
rectional administrators and legislative bodies who have far greater
authority to define the quality of life of prisoners. Indirectly blaming
women for resisting oppression in the workplace, Posner's analysis
stops short of analyzing the sexualization of power in relation to cross-
gender searches. Posner's criticism of feminists who have championed
equal employment opportunities for women in the non-traditional
prison workplace diverts attention away from the complicity of correc-
tional administrators in perpetuating sexist hierarchies of masculinity
that privilege sexual aggression. These hierarchies of masculinity
order power among guards as well as prisoners.238
236 Id. at 155.
237 See NICOLE H. RAFTER, PARTIAL JUSTICE: WOMEN, PRISONS & SOCIAL CONTROL (2d
ed. 1990).
238 Although this article has discussed the ordering of power among male prisoners, it has
said little about the role of masculinities in ordering power among guards. In the traditionally
male-dominated and overwhelmingly numerically male prison workplace, female guards fre-
quently encounter sex-based opposition and harassment from male colleagues. The competency
of female guards is questioned in the basis of their biological sex. In a survey of nearly one
hundred male guards, Lynn Zimmer found that male guards had negative attitudes about work-
ing with female guards for two principle reasons. They felt women impaired the security of the
prison and jeopardized the safety of the male guards by not being sufficiently intimidating or
aggressive toward inmates. See ZIMMER, supra note 51, at 54-55. Strong male opposition to
women in the blue-collar prison workplace frequently finds expression in harassing conduct,
another means of re-asserting male dominance over intrusive female colleagues. Female guards
have reported serious forms of harassment such as hazing, undermining performance evalua-
tions, and receiving unfavorable work assignments after refusing sexual advances from superiors;
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Posner's opinion errs in blaming diminished prisoner privacy-
and the indignity prisoners suffer therefore-on women who seek
employment opportunities previously reserved to men. However,
these women (and the feminists who support their equal employment)
ultimately lack the power to mediate the sexism, fratriarchy and hier-
archical masculinities that encourage sexual predation in men's pris-
ons. Indeed the small number of women employed as guards in men's
higher security prisons and jails are treated harshly by male counter-
parts who object to their presence. Correctional administrators have
far more agency to influence the conditions under which female
guards work (and under which vulnerable male prisoners are con-
fined) than feminists. As I discussed previously, prison guards manip-
ulate the sexually predacious environment in men's prisons to their
advantage. Ultimately, Posner's critique of the doctrine of cross-gen-
der searches is limited. In targeting the movement of women into
non-traditional employment as correctional officers, his argument can-
not reach beyond moral taboo to discuss complexities of gender, sex
and sexual orientation at the base of the regulation of cross-gender
searches.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that cross-gender searches raise
many complex issues beyond the constitutional scope of prisoner pri-
vacy. They suggest that the way in which judges use and apply notions
of sex, gender and sexual orientation are outdated in the context of
prisons. Cross-gender searches also raise the issue of the role of
women as security staff in men's prisons. For instance, the frequency
with which cross-gender searches are challenged in men's prisons
demonstrates that women guarding men is viewed differently than
men guarding women. A close look at the institutional context of
these searches in men's prisons reveals an underlying tension with
respect to introducing women to a violent, masculinized and punitive
environment. The propriety of cross-gender searches spotlights the
sexualization of power in prison, the violent and sexually predacious
environment in which prisoners are incarcerated, and the complicity
of guards in maintaining the environment in their decisions to exercise
or refrain from exercising their search authority.
as well as less serious but unremitting comments about physical appearance, gossip among male
colleagues about their sexual preference and sexually derogatory nicknames. See id. at 93-96.
[Vol. 10:2
